Editorial focus: Shared prosperity and collective security

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25 years
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Cover photo: Tin ore mined in Njingala, North Kivu. (Sasha Lezhneva/Enough Project)
Our world is at a crucial crossroads that can either result in a planet characterised by growing poverty, inequality and exploitation of the poor, or a planet characterised by a new global consciousness to build collective prosperity for all without “leaving anyone behind.”

The path we choose today can lead us to a dangerous world characterised by the dominance of predatory forces exploiting the weak, poor and middle-class people, who rely on a functioning state to mediate between those who “have” (that number is shrinking) and the rest. These predatory forces range from super-wealthy individuals or those linked to the dark forces of drugs, arms and human traffickers – driven by their interests to plunder and profit – to forces representing competing religious, racial and ethnic groups, who are driven to impose or protect their narrow group interests. In this scenario, only the wealthy few will be able to insulate themselves, by erecting high walls and employing round-the-clock security. Here, the only difference between a gated community and a gated country is scale.

Or we can choose another path, which leads to a world characterised by people who are committed to building collective prosperity and collective security. It will be based on the shared understanding that we live on one planet where technology, travel and trade are making our world smaller and spawning a new generation of globally networked citizens who are building a common identity, allowing us to shape new cultures, values, normative rules, identities and communities.

This world of collective prosperity and collective security can only evolve if we are able to build a global private sector, state and civil society coalition of like-minded people. Recently, many global movements – including the Occupy Movement, the Fair Trade Movement and the Environmental Justice Movement – have mobilised people around individual themes. There is a need now for such movements to unite people under a new global social contract that builds a shared vision for collective prosperity and collective security.

Building a new social contract means uniting people on a common vision, not dividing them on their narrow fears. My previous Conflict Trends editorial refers to a growing disenchantment with the prevailing global establishment and the rise of a populism based on fear and insecurity. This phenomenon threatened to unleash a wave of right-wing governments in the 2017 European elections. Fortunately, this did not materialise in the Netherlands, where the incumbent liberal leader saw off a challenge from the conservative right-wing leader, who canvassed on a narrow platform exploiting the fears of “indigenous” Dutch citizens. However, this victory will be short-lived unless it is converted into a movement that transcends narrow identities and unifies citizens along broader, values-driven politics.

Germany’s recent decision, as part of its G20 presidency, to launch the “Compact with Africa” programme to build African economies is a move in the right direction. Such constructive efforts should be advanced to build shared prosperity that will ensure collective security. We should be able to engage in travel, trade and tourism without fear of terrorist attacks, conflict or war.

A world based on shared prosperity – eliminating the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality – is not only desirable but is necessary for the survival of humanity. It is not a utopian dream. The world has enough resources, and there are ample innovators and entrepreneurs to grow the world economy. However, we need visionary leaders who understand how to tax those resources and redistribute that wealth to benefit society. There are many examples across the world where visionary leaders and selfless people have joined forces to build safe, secure and prosperous societies. Let’s emulate them!

Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive Director of ACCORD.
CONFLICT-SENSITIVE REPATRIATION: LESSONS FROM DISPLACED COMMUNITIES IN NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA

BY TATSUSHI ARAI

This article analyses the humanitarian crisis in north-eastern Nigeria and explores practical steps that the affected communities and humanitarian agencies in the region can take to facilitate relief, repatriation and reconstruction efforts. A brief description of the regional and political context is first provided as background information for the discussion that follows.

The Context and Purpose of the Inquiry

At the point of its founding in the early 2000s, Boko Haram – which means “Western education is prohibited” in Hausa – was an Islamic group committed to fighting unjust and corrupt political rule and establishing an Islamic state in northern Nigeria under Sharia (Islamic) law. Its official Arabic name, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” Under the leadership of its founder Mohammed Yusuf, his associates at the

Al-Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri (the capital of Borno State) organised themselves into a powerful Islamic movement. Boko Haram soon established its strongholds in Borno and Yobe states and expanded its decentralised network of followers in Bauchi, Kano and other northern states.

A critical turning point for Boko Haram’s popular movement came in the summer of 2009, when violent clashes broke out between Boko Haram and the military in Maimakwari against the backdrop of the government’s deepening resolve to curb Boko Haram’s influence. During the course of the escalating conflict, Boko Haram systematically attacked police headquarters, stations and officers. The military retaliated and hundreds of people were killed—mostly Boko Haram members—and Yusuf and other leaders of the group were captured. The police summarily executed Yusuf at their headquarters in Maimakwari, making him a martyr and a cause of Boko Haram’s long-standing insurgency campaign.

Abubakar Shekau, the group’s second-in-command, succeeded Yusuf and, since 2010, significantly expanded its campaign of violence and retaliation. Demanding that the government restore the group’s destroyed mosque, bring the killers of Yusuf to justice and release detained group members, Boko Haram began an all-out war against the police, military and government offices and personnel. Boko Haram subsequently expanded the scope of its targets to what it viewed as sympathisers of its enemy. Its new targets included Christians, critical Muslims, traditional leaders, United Nations (UN) agencies, schools, bars and health workers providing polio vaccinations. Since 2009, an ever-growing cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency attacks has claimed tens of thousands of lives on all sides. Moreover, Boko Haram’s attacks and the military’s responses to these attacks have claimed many lives in Cameroon, Chad and Niger—three countries that share the conflict-affected Lake Chad basin with Nigeria.

Humanitarian consequences of the violence have been unprecedented and catastrophic. According to a UN report published in November 2016, Boko Haram’s violence and military counter-operations displaced 1.8 million people internally and drove an additional 190,000 people into neighbouring countries.
Of the combined population of 26 million people in the conflict-affected north-eastern Nigerian states, 14 million people – or 54% of the population – are in need of humanitarian assistance in such areas as health, nutrition, shelter, water and education. Approximately five million people are facing food shortages, and this number is likely to increase in years to come. Borno, Yobe and Adamawa are three of the most severely-affected states in terms of the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis.

Given the long-standing political grievances that gave rise to the current humanitarian and security crisis, an effective response must include long-term government-civil society collaboration in devising a political solution to the root causes of the insurgency. Elements of such a political solution include accountability in the delivery of justice and law enforcement; inclusive governance; a development policy that ensures improved resource access and employment; reformed systems of secular and religious education; and a community-based participatory process of truth-telling, intercommunal reconciliation and trauma healing. While these are all important long-term steps, an immediate task that must be undertaken is to overcome the humanitarian crisis caused by the displacements. With the military gains that the Nigerian security forces recently made in the north-eastern areas that Boko Haram once controlled, the focus of crisis management is now shifting toward the repatriation of displaced people hoping to return to their deeply divided home communities.

APPROXIMATELY FIVE MILLION PEOPLE ARE FACING FOOD SHORTAGES, AND THIS NUMBER IS LIKELY TO INCREASE IN YEARS TO COME

It is against this background that field research was conducted in June–July 2016 in Maiduguri and Yola, the capital city of Adamawa State. Both cities, and their neighbouring towns and villages in which the field research was conducted, were severely affected by the insurgency and displacement. Focusing on the challenges and needs of the internally displaced persons (IDPs), data collection for the research consisted of in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions with both males and females, youth members and leaders of displaced communities, government personnel in charge of official IDP camps, the police mobilised for peacekeeping, and representatives of humanitarian agencies serving the displaced communities. Central findings and recommendations from the research focused on two main questions:

1. What forms of humanitarian support and improved self-help do displaced communities need to resolve rising community disputes in their places of refuge and prevent the disputes from escalating into public unrest?
2. What forms of humanitarian support and improved self-help do displaced communities need to prepare for repatriation and to rebuild relationships with those
whom they believe to be Boko Haram sympathisers and adversaries?

A common thread connecting the two questions is the need for conflict sensitivity – a form of development and humanitarian assistance that purposefully incorporates practitioners’ assessment and awareness of the prevailing context of conflict. More specifically, conflict-sensitive development and humanitarian assistance consists of:

1. systematically analysing the context of the conflict in which one’s intervention takes place;
2. understanding the interaction between the context and the intervention; and
3. acting on the understanding of this interaction in such a well-coordinated manner as to maximise positive impact and minimise negative impact.

In the context of north-eastern Nigeria’s IDP settlements and their host communities, conflict-sensitive humanitarian support requires sensitivity to the ethnolinguistic, tribal and regional differences that the displaced people have brought from the conflict-affected home regions in which they once lived. Conflict-sensitive support also requires building mutual trust and fairness between the government agencies supporting the IDPs and the IDPs themselves with respect to government action in the provision of shelter, food and other basic needs.

The two sets of recommendations derived from the field research correspond to the two questions that guided the research:

1. Enable the IDP communities to expand their conflict-handling capacity.
2. Enhance the IDP communities’ readiness to resolve and prevent conflicts that may arise during the course of their repatriation to their home communities.

The remainder of this article elaborates on these two recommendations. The discussion draws on the findings from the field research. It also builds on the practical experience of the author, who worked with Nigerian humanitarian support professionals in the north-eastern region as their conflict resolution trainer.

Expanding IDP Communities’ Conflict-handling Capacity

Across different types of government-supported formal IDP settlements and informal settlements outside the government’s preview, overlapping characteristics of community-based practices in dispute settlement were identified. A clear understanding of these community practices is a prerequisite for making a sound judgement about what the strengths of these practices are, as well as what additional steps the communities will need to take to meet their unprecedented humanitarian crisis. In broad outline, these characteristics of community practices can be summarised as follows:

An informal settlement of internally displaced persons in Malkohi, outside Yola, capital of Adamawa State, Nigeria.
Precondition for effective dispute settlement:

- There are appointed camp chairmen (in the case of government-supported official camps) and respected IDP community leaders (in the case of informal camps outside the government’s preview). These chairmen and leaders typically had some form of leadership roles in their home communities. They come from mid- to high-level socio-economic status and respected kinship.

Frequently adopted steps to practise dispute settlement:

- Individual conflict parties attempt to resolve their dispute, when the dispute is relatively small and manageable to them.
- In government-supported formal camps, committees set up to serve camp residents’ specific needs such as food and security can intervene to facilitate dispute resolution. When these committees intervene, their collective efforts in dispute resolution supplement or override disputants’ self-guided effort in problem-solving.
- Should the parties (or specialised committees set up in formal camps) fail in dispute resolution, they bring their dispute to their camp chairman and/or IDP community leader. Elders may also be asked to support dispute resolution.
- The camp chairman or IDP community leader listens to all sides of the dispute, either in person or in a group setting, or in some combination of both. The chairman or community leader may consult elders as needed, following local customs.
- The examination of the conflict often involves finding and pointing out a “fault” that one side of the conflict over the other is deemed to have.
- With the support of elders and with their traditional authority, the camp chairman or IDP community leader serves as an arbiter. They often issue a binding resolution to the conflict parties.
- When a fault of one or more parties is identified as a perceived cause of the dispute, the camp chairman or IDP community leader offers guidance, in addition to a reprimand as needed, to the party in question. The goal of their guidance is to support the party’s need to fulfil their responsibility to offer restitution.
- When disputants come from two or more townships and/or villages, or when the issues under inquiry affect multiple communities, elders from each of the communities are invited to offer their own perspectives. Groups of elders will each assume the responsibility for guiding their own communities.

Children, who have fled Boko Haram violence in the north-eastern region of Nigeria, participate in aerobic exercises at Maikohi secondary school at the camp for internally displaced persons in Yola, Adamawa State (January 2015).
to carry out agreed-upon actions. These actions are designed to restore intercommunal peace.

- At official camps where the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) – a federal government institution in charge of camp management – takes an institutionally mandated role and responsibility for resolving conflicts on a relatively larger scale, a multi-stakeholder forum is organised. Complex and serious conflicts that have escalated into intercommunal violence can also be handled by this forum. Once such a forum is established to resolve an intercommunal dispute, NEMA works with the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) – a provincial government institution in charge of camp management – to bring together camp leaders, representing different townships of origin as well as humanitarian agencies serving the camp. The forum seeks to establish a fair and inclusive process in which the conflict parties can air their grievances and have this collective body jointly arrive at a mutually acceptable binding resolution.

To the extent that these traditional community-based practices, with or without state support, have been used for a long time, it is neither feasible nor desirable to introduce any form of outside interventions that encourage the communities to suddenly depart from their familiar practices in arbitration. However, it must be noted that many of the disputes arising at these IDP camps and in their host communities are unprecedented and unfamiliar to both the IDPs and their host communities. The unprecedented nature of the disputes is illustrated by their devastating experiences of displacement, deprivation, severe collective trauma and ethnic tensions. These devastating experiences have contributed to the rise of highly complex protracted conflicts that the traditional practices of arbitration alone may not be able to handle. Such observations of the communities’ challenges support the need to introduce culturally sensitive ways of capacity-building that enable these communities to handle their disputes more effectively. Given this background, qualified Nigerian and international professionals in humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding should consider providing these communities with capacity-building opportunities in the following three areas:

1. Capacity-building for community leaders, both male and female, and elders on how to identify the sources of conflict: Simple techniques for diagnosing conflict – such as asking open-ended questions about why a disputant came to take a position that they took – would be helpful. Careful diagnosis of conflict should help both the arbiters and the disputants to understand more deeply and empathise with the disputants’ human needs and motivations requiring expression and fulfilment.
The goal of this diagnostic process is to see alternatives to regular perspectives and judgments about which party is right or wrong and who is to blame. For example, in recent mediation training that the author conducted for Nigerian humanitarian assistance professionals brought together in Maiduguri, the metaphor of an onion – an object used to illustrate a multi-layered reason for a conflict party’s entrenched position – was introduced. The onion metaphor suggests that a third-party facilitator can identify the underlying need and motive of each conflict party’s stated position by asking the party why they came to take the stated position. In this inquiry, the position is compared to the visible surface of an onion. The onion metaphor helps a third party carry out an empathetic, reflective dialogue with each conflict party and uncover the deeper levels of the party’s unarticulated needs and aspirations. Such an incremental process of deepening inquiry resembles the task of carefully peeling away one layer of an onion at a time until the small inner core of the onion is revealed. Post-workshop survey results indicated that the training participants generally appreciated the usefulness of the onion metaphor as a tool for active listening and diagnosis.

2. **Capacity-building for community leaders and elders on how to generate multiple options for conflict resolution:** A simple simulation that involves asking each pair of community members to come up with as many mutually acceptable solutions as possible to a conflict between two people competing for one orange proved helpful. In the Maiduguri workshop, Nigerian humanitarian support professionals proposed not only splitting the orange in half and dividing the orange juice, but also planting seeds together to harvest more oranges in the future. The goal of this skill-building exercise is to stimulate creative thinking that transcends the familiar zero-sum (win/lose) mindset that tends to dominate arbitrators’ thinking. While the communities’ capacity to arrive at resolutions through arbitration should be retained as viable and useful, care must also be taken not to suppress disputants’ unfulfilled needs that may exacerbate their frustration and unrest under the current circumstances of humanitarian crisis.

3. **Capacity-building for community leaders and elders to work on both the advantages and challenges of their familiar practices of arbitration:** In this process of capacity-building, arbitration should be contrasted to mediation, as a method of conflict resolution that is more disputant-centred, more participatory, more voluntary and less binding. The goal of this capacity-building process is to enable community leaders and elders to expand their scope of resolution options outside the well-established arbitration procedures with which they are familiar. In the long run, the expansion of their resolution options should enable them to expand their freedom to devise more sustainable ways of serving their communities’ needs and preventing aggressive behaviour and public unrest.

One way of introducing these and other useful skills is to perform an engaging skit on a concrete scenario of conflict with which they are familiar. The skit can introduce the useful skills previously mentioned and help community members prepare for participatory dialogues on the practical application of the skills.

It must be emphasised that an increase in the awareness and capacity of community leaders, elders and members to handle conflicts peacefully and to prevent conflicts from escalating into systematic violence will contribute significantly to their repatriation. One way of motivating them to learn basic skills in the diagnosis and resolution of community-based conflicts is to link these skills explicitly to their deep aspiration to return home. Doing so can also help them fulfill their desire to restore peaceful coexistence in their home communities upon return.

**THE GOAL OF THIS CAPACITY-BUILDING PROCESS IS TO ENABLE COMMUNITY LEADERS AND ELDERS TO EXPAND THEIR SCOPE OF RESOLUTION OPTIONS OUTSIDE THE WELL-ESTABLISHED ARBITRATION PROCEDURES WITH WHICH THEY ARE FAMILIAR**

**Enabling Returnees to Prevent Conflict and Promote Coexistence**

The IDP communities’ expanded capacity to resolve disputes on their own can help rebuild relationships and livelihood upon their return to their home towns and villages. However, given the enormity of the scale and complexity that the repatriation movement in north-eastern Nigeria entails, additional capacity-building aimed specifically at facilitating intercommunal confidence-building and coexistence is needed on a much larger scale. These efforts for capacity-building must increase the returnees’ ability and self-confidence to ensure their security. The efforts must also help restore functional relationships with those whom the returnees suspect to be Boko Haram sympathisers back home. Overall, these efforts are imperative because under the existing circumstances of tension and mistrust, minor disputes can quickly escalate into large-scale violence.

The fragility of relationships between the returnees and their home communities calls for conflict-sensitive repatriation planning and support. In north-eastern Nigeria, the affected communities, involved government agencies and humanitarian support organisations should not only
refrain from doing any harm to the social contexts in which repatriation takes place, but must also proactively incorporate the basic principles of conflict prevention and resolution into humanitarian and development assistance to facilitate conflict-sensitive repatriation. An observation of humanitarian activities on the ground, however, suggests that conflict prevention and resolution is either missing or failing to be mainstreamed sufficiently. To fill this gap, the stakeholder communities and organisations must consider sustained, well-funded efforts to build the returnees’ and home communities’ capacities and awareness in the following four interrelated areas:

1. **Practical reconciliation**: Reconciliation is a sustained social process that seeks to realise a closure to revenge while simultaneously promoting healing from trauma and guilt. While the activities required to facilitate reconciliation focus on psychosocial support and relationship-building, it is often useful to tie reconciliation processes systematically to livelihood development. Such an integrated approach to reconciliation and development, when planned and carried out skilfully, can bring divided communities together to generate immediate, tangible benefits and build relationships. The existing practices of livelihood support that can be utilised to facilitate practical reconciliation in north-eastern Nigeria include skills-building, mentoring and equipment support for income generation through initiatives, such as sewing, that purposefully bring women from different ethnic and regional communities together. Members’ voluntary consent in participation and risk-taking is required.

2. **Functional coexistence**: Functional coexistence, a concept developed by this author, describes a sustained adversarial relationship between two or more parties – either individuals or groups – who actively refuse to recognise each other as a legitimate partner to deal with, but who still choose not to use physical violence to settle their differences. Experience in many deeply divided societies that underwent genocides and mass killings suggests that the communities affected by such large-scale violence categorically reject both the desirability and practicality of peaceful coexistence. A premature move to promote reconciliation in these contexts can cause deep resentment and further exacerbate existing divisions. Given this background, one may argue that the events which took place across the severely conflict-affected townships and villages in north-eastern Nigeria exhibit the characteristics of a society in need of functional coexistence. Similar to practical reconciliation, functional coexistence focuses on building pragmatic intergroup relations that can facilitate much-needed practical functions of the groups. These relationships, often devoid of trust or empathy, can be built through coordinated activities such as initiating and restoring intercommunal markets, water points, transportation hubs and livelihood projects. Unlike with activities designed for practical reconciliation, however, reconciliation (meaning closure
and healing) is presented to the communities neither as a goal nor as an expectation of the activities. Reconciliation may evolve over time and be welcomed as a consequence.

3. Mediative process: A mediative process is defined as a wide spectrum of sustained group-based processes that seek to bring members of divided communities together to meet their shared needs and purposes, which can transcend the underlying reasons for their divisions. These social processes may not necessarily look like conventional mediation sessions, which have a distinct beginning and end. Nor are they likely to involve a well-defined set of conflict parties and intermediaries, who typically meet in confidential settings. Unlike mediation sessions, mediative social processes are open to diverse participants who can move in and out freely and interact to build relationships in open public settings. In many of these sustained mediative processes, there is no fixed time frame regarding when the processes formally start or end. Examples of mediative processes introduced in conflict-affected societies include the hosting of interfaith and intercommunal peace festivals, intercommunal schools and intercommunal clinics – all focusing on basic human needs that transcend the politicised causes of division. In the context of Nigeria’s intercommunal tension, the activities of the Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum in Kaduna – an interfaith peacemaking organisation established in 1995 by two former enemies, Pastor James Wuye and Imam Muhammad Ashafa – cogently illustrate effective mediative processes. Noteworthy achievements in the two leaders’ efforts to develop mediative initiatives include the consensus built among some 20 senior religious leaders in Kaduna State to adopt the Kaduna Peace Declaration on 22 August 2003. This declaration was significant, because it established a sustained platform of Christian-Muslim partnership aimed at preventing religiously inspired violence and promoting intercommunal peace. Consistent with what the interfaith initiatives in Kaduna demonstrated, findings from the field research in north-eastern Nigeria suggest that the devastated communities to which the IDPs in Maiduguri, Yola and their neighbouring towns hope to return will need mediative processes more than conventional mediation. The use of mediation, like traditional arbitration, should not be excluded, however, and it must be kept intact as a reliable means of problem-solving. Conceptually, a mediative process offers an overarching framework of thinking and practice that can support and incorporate functional coexistence and practical reconciliation.

4. Collective reparation: Reparation refers to compensation for a loss, injury and/or harm. Developed by civil society initiatives in such contexts as post-genocide Rwanda, collective reparation refers to an integrated process of...
mutual help, livelihood support and collective healing through which perpetrators work with willing others – including victims and bystanders of mass violence – to pool their personal resources. The collective resources are then given to the most vulnerable victims in the community through a well-institutionalised participatory system of decision-making. In some Rwandan communities, reparation is offered in the form of labour as much as in financial and material form to accommodate what is practical and mutually acceptable to the communities. While the Rwanda example is relatively modest, it nevertheless suggests a useful model of community-based reparation, livelihood support and reconciliation that north-eastern Nigeria’s IDP communities can choose to implement upon repatriation. The indication of “collective” in this context, however, should not be taken to downplay the centrality of a more formal state-led reparation process, which would most likely need to build on a Nigerian adaptation of a truth and reconciliation process.

The four examples of community-based practice described – practical reconciliation, functional coexistence, mediative processes and collective reparation – suggest practical ways in which social conditions conducive to IDPs’ peaceful repatriation can be developed. These activities also seek to enable the IDPs to rebuild relationships and livelihoods, either in their home communities or in new communities in which they may choose to settle. Either way, to make their transition peaceful and successfully prevent intercommunal violence, effective coordination between the IDPs, their host and home communities, law enforcement and security forces, civilian government institutions, humanitarian agencies and other stakeholders involved, is essential.

**Conclusion**

Based on the field research conducted in north-eastern Nigeria, this article explored concrete steps to expand the capacity of IDPs and conflict-affected communities to prevent and resolve conflicts. It also explored practical means by which to enable IDPs to return home peacefully and fulfil their basic needs for livelihood, security and reconciliation. The overarching theme of the article is conflict sensitivity – a form of humanitarian and development practice that utilises conflict assessment to minimise harm and maximise positive impact on the social context of intervention.

An essential requirement for conflict-sensitive repatriation and development that the interviewees in this study highlighted is the communities’ trust in the provincial and federal governments’ commitment to providing security and resource support. The widespread perception and discontent among the IDPs and conflict-affected communities about the authorities’ illicit activities in diverting food and other humanitarian supplies from IDP camps are severely undermining the authorities’ capacity to facilitate repatriation. To overcome this long-standing challenge, ethical and visionary political leadership is urgently needed. Immediate practical steps for government authorities to regain public confidence include making a firm public commitment to upholding humanitarian principles to serve conflict-affected communities in dire need of assistance.

Dr Tatsushi Arai is a Professor of Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation at the School for International Training (SIT) Graduate Institute and a Fellow of the Center for Peacemaking Practice at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution in the United States.

**Endnotes**

Introduction

The province of North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has seen little respite from conflict in more than two decades. It was here that the ethnic violence that preceded the First Congo War broke out in 1993 and it is here that the conflict continues to the present day. The defeat of the largest rebel group, Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), in November 2013 has only served to further fragment the armed group landscape, and there are currently more than 70 groups active in the region. In 2003, an armistice agreement brought peace to most of the DRC. But the eastern provinces, and particularly North Kivu, remained restive. Why? Most media accounts focus on the illegal exploitation of mineral resources that is thought to generate violence in three ways: national and foreign actors compete for control of the mining sites; groups are able to finance their operations; and groups employ violence against civilians to gain control over resource-rich areas, or the ability to exploit them. Indeed, minerals are considered so closely linked to violence they have been dubbed “the engines of chaos.”

BY GAVIN LYALL
In November 2012 the M23 rebel group occupied Goma.

Conflict in North Kivu since 2003

By early 2004, the peace process was already starting to unravel in North Kivu. Under the terms of the deal, all belligerents were to join a transitional government and merge their forces into one national army. However, it quickly became clear that not all parties were fully committed to peace. An early sign of this was the defection of three senior Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) officers – among them Laurent Nkunda – to form a political movement that morphed into the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) rebellion in July 2006. The region was once again plunged into turmoil, with fighting reaching the intensity of the Second Congo War. Whilst Mai Mai (self-defence militias) were responsible for some of this violence, the struggle between the CNDP and the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) – the largest Rwandan Hutu group – was at its heart.

The CNDP captured substantial territory in North Kivu and took steps to establish alternative administration structures. A police force was set up, some school fees and health bills paid and communal labour organised to repair the roads. Money was raised by exacting taxes on “everything from small kiosks to mining and the charcoal trade”. Unable to defeat the CNDP militarily, DRC authorities struck a deal with Rwanda (backers of the CNDP and providers of protection for the group’s leader, Nkunda) that brought the rebellion to a sudden end in late 2008.

Under new leadership, the CNDP signed a peace accord in Goma in March 2009, which allowed the group to keep its command structures in place. When moves were made to dismantle these, a splinter group launched the M23 rebellion in May 2012. A series of offences captured the territorial capital of Rutshuru, the Bunagana border and the military base of Rumangabo. This run of success swelled M23’s ranks and it took steps to legitimise itself by strengthening its political wing, setting up a tax collection network and liaising with humanitarian workers in the areas under its control.

In November 2012, M23 occupied Goma. But the occupation, along with the publication of a report by the United Nations (UN) Group of Experts, put the spotlight on the support M23 was receiving from Rwanda. Several Western countries, including the United States (US), suspended financial aid to Rwanda – and Rwanda, in turn, cut its support to M23. Peace talks began, but were conducted in only a desultory manner by both sides. However, the talks did precipitate a split in M23, whose leadership was divided...
Troops of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) cheer after taking control, with assistance from the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), of M23’s highly strategic position, an area known as Three Towers on the hills of Kibati, near Goma.

over what position to take. In late October 2013, following suspension of the peace talks, the DRC army, assisted by the Intervention Brigade and UN troops, launched a successful offensive. Within two weeks, the rebel group had been driven from all its strongholds in North Kivu and completely defeated.7

Challenging the Narrative

The economic dimensions of civil war and the existence of a “resource curse” have been of keen interest to researchers since the late 1990s. Paul Collier8 was the first to draw an explicit link between reliance on primary commodities and the onset of civil war, theorising that belligerents entered into conflicts to benefit materially. Rebel movements might identify themselves in terms of grievances, but in reality these were little more than self-serving justifications. Later work qualified the initial theory by emphasising the role of feasibility: civil war is still caused by greed, but mostly likely will occur in environments where an economic base can sustain it.9 There is no place in the feasibility hypothesis for the idea that rebellion can be a legitimate response to state criminality. In North Kivu, state officials in some capacity have been responsible for most human rights violations. This sanctioned criminality has exacerbated the already massive social and economic inequalities and created “genuine and extreme grievances”.10

REBEL MOVEMENTS MIGHT IDENTIFY THEMSELVES IN TERMS OF GRIEVANCES, BUT IN REALITY THESE WERE LITTLE MORE THAN SELF-SERVING JUSTIFICATIONS

In addition to the feasibility perspective, it has been theorised that the availability of natural resources shapes the dynamics of rebel movements. There are two aspects to this. First, resource riches enable groups to recruit on the basis of short-term rewards. This leads to the ranks being swelled by opportunistic joiners who have little commitment to the cause. Second, economically motivated leaders will gradually come to the fore. Whilst the evidence that fighters join for financial reasons remains tentative, the tendency for groups to favour economic motivations over time has more empirical backing. The process of “economisation” –
During its peak activity M23 made no attempt to target or control mining sites.

whereby groups gradually reorient towards profiting from the opportunities opened up by war – was one of the defining features of the Second Congo War.11

The CNDP is thought to have earned only 15% of its revenue from the mineral trade.12 However, this information must be qualified by recognising that the CNDP seems to be something of an outlier – with other groups, the percentage was far higher. M23 followed a similar pattern. According to an International Peace Information Service (IPIS)13 report, M23 was not involved in the mining sector, and control over minerals was not a priority for the group. During the roughly 18-month period the group was at its peak, it made no attempt to target mining sites, nor did it conduct mineral exports through the areas under its control. The group mainly financed its rebellion by levying taxes on households and transport.14

This does not mean M23 failed to profit from the mineral trade. A significant measure of the group’s transport tax revenue came from the export of coltan and cassiterite across the Goma/Gisenyi border. M23 also had traders in its employ, and benefited from the “liberation” of significant stocks of minerals. The group probably calculated that there was no need for it physically to occupy the mines when it controlled the routes in and out of the region. This could be linked with the mineral being mined: metals like tin, coltan and wolframite are only valuable in bulk and therefore can be taxed easily at border crossings or on roads. Direct control of diamond and gold mines could be more important. Furthermore, fieldwork and research has shown that while only a small number of sites are under the direct control of armed groups, all levels of the mineral supply chain are vulnerable to exploitation.15

THE MEASURE OF POPULAR SUPPORT THEY HAD, ALONG WITH THE FACT THEY WERE STRONG ENOUGH TO CONTROL TERRITORY, MEANT THAT TAXATION AND TRANSPORT TAXES MADE UP THE BULK OF THEIR INCOME

Whilst both the CNDP and M23 made money from mineral resources, it was not their primary motivation or their main source of income. The measure of popular support they had, along with the fact they were strong enough to control territory, meant that taxation and transport taxes made up the bulk of their income. These two forms of income are not unconnected to the mineral trade, so it would be unwise
to make any sweeping claims. However, the impact of the mining embargo seems to support Johnson’s assertion that the “the existence of a trade in minerals is not a factor favouring either conflict or its absence in North Kivu”. This dynamic is clear when the trajectory of the trade in coltan is considered. Whilst a price boom in the early 2000s led many groups to finance their operations by trading in coltan, once the price of the mineral dropped, it returned to being just one of many income streams, which included everything from gold and tin to wildlife and theft of consumer goods.

Field research by Laudati draws attention to the predatory and informal “economy of violence” that has taken root in the region. Roadblocks, the levying of taxes, profits from forest resources (charcoal, timber and hemp), the pillaging of livestock and organised theft all contribute to the income of the various rebel groups.

Income is also generated from non-mineral goods that form the basis of the everyday economy. No activity, no matter how low level, escapes predation, and products as seemingly small as milk, cheese and palm oil are also targeted.

There is a widespread perception that the CNDP and M23 were Rwandan proxies created to continue the profiteering that began in earnest during the Second Congo War. Although Rwanda remains deeply involved with mining activities in North Kivu, security concerns rather than economic interests are the primary motivation. The most pressing of these concerns is the continued presence of FDLR remnants in the area. There is also a general distrust of the DRC government, which is viewed as weak, corrupt and unable to keep order in its eastern territories.

That being said, the support M23 received from the Rwandan government has been well documented. According to testimony given to Stearns by Ugandan officials and former M23 members, Rwanda was involved with the group from its inception. The UN Group of Experts reported that the Rwandan government provided direct military support, “facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating

ALTHOUGH RWANDA REMAINS DEEPLY INVOLVED WITH MINING ACTIVITIES IN NORTH KIVU, SECURITY CONCERNS RATHER THAN ECONOMIC INTERESTS ARE THE PRIMARY MOTIVATION

Rebel groups also generate income from non-mineral goods that are the basis of the everyday economy, for example, palm oil.
desertions from the armed forces of the DRC, and providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice."

**Conclusion**

Since the end of the 1990s, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Global Witness have campaigned for anti-“conflict-minerals” initiatives and legislation, on the grounds that profits from these minerals fuel conflicts. These campaigns led to the creation of a UN Panel of Inquiry – which, in turn, led to a raft of legislation being passed or projects being set up to reform the mining sector. In July 2010, the US Dodd-Frank Act was passed and, shortly afterwards, the DRC government suspended mining in the eastern provinces in what amounted to a de facto embargo on minerals emanating from the Kivus. However, the ban did not have the result intended. Armed groups seemed barely affected by the loss of income from minerals, quickly diversifying their income streams.

The Congo wars had a devastating effect on the DRC economy. Agricultural communities were devastated, and the scarcity of land means young men cannot turn to farming. Large-scale criminal operations remain widespread. However, the assumption of “greed” prevalent in some theories of resources and conflict is inaccurate. For most of those involved, the mineral trade is simply a way to get by in a society where poverty is endemic.

Although natural resources did not cause the wars in the DRC, there was a progressive “economisation” whereby the violence became increasingly motivated by profit. By the end of the Second Congo War, this pattern was established and powerful people were making a great deal of money.

*These campaigns led to the creation of a UN panel of inquiry – which, in turn, led to a raft of legislation being passed or projects being set up to reform the mining sector.*

It would be tempting to see the CNDP and M23 rebellions as a continuation of this process. Both were “top-down” rebellions that began as army mutinies, and the enrichment of these movement’s leaders is well documented. We can perhaps see evidence of Weinstein’s theory of a “resource curse” within the dynamics of a rebel movement in the trajectory of the CNDP and M23. The first M23 mutiny collapsed after a few days, with most ex-CNDP troops returning to the army. Reportedly, the soldiers were tired of seeing their commanders get rich.

*Under tight security, a Congolese miner bags raw chunks of cassiterite (the base element of tin).*
Although rebel groups use these resources to fund their operations, it does not follow that they are the driving force of the conflict. If this were the case, military activities would focus on establishing direct control over resource-rich areas. This has not been the case in North Kivu, where there has been no fighting around control of significant mining sites. It is also true that the Grand Nord part of the region has seen far less violence, despite being home to the gold and diamond mining sites that resource theory suggests rebels would find most attractive.

It is clear that minerals have been a powerful factor in the conflicts, but the exact relationship between North Kivu’s resource wealth and the waging of war is harder to decipher than mainstream discourse captures. Le Billon notes that primary commodities are “highly amenable to taxing and looting” and therefore a means of “escalating and prolonging” conflict. But whilst both M23 and CNDP made money from mineral resources, it was not their primary motivation or their main source of income. The rebellions were about demographics, citizenship and land rights and were fuelled not by greed but by the belief that the DRC government was not able or willing to protect the Tutsi community. The existence of a thriving mineral trade is not, in the words of Dominic Johnson, “a factor favouring either conflict or its absence in North Kivu.” It is therefore crucial that attempts to reach a better understanding of violence in the region focus on political and social causes, rather than economic ones.

Gavin Lyall is a recent Master’s graduate from the University of Kent’s International Conflict and Security Programme.

Endnotes
5 Autesserre, Séverine (2010) op. cit., p. 16.
19 Stearns, Jason (2012b) op. cit., pp. 55–57.
20 Ibid., p. 144.
25 Stearns, Jason (2012b) op. cit., p. 39.
26 Johnson, Dominic (2009) op. cit.
29 Stearns, Jason (2012b) op. cit., p. 9.
30 Johnson, Dominic (2009) op. cit.
SECURITY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE AFRICAN BORDERLANDS: A PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACH

BY DOMINIC NAISH

Introduction

Borders and borderlands in Africa are spaces where the nexus of security, development, crime, conflict and politics is often at its most dynamic. In theory, borders serve to demarcate states’ territory, and the movement of goods and people across them are managed in the interests of national trade and security. In practice, African borders are often little more than notional lines across huge stretches of land or water. This article examines the increasing prominence of border security in policy discussions and introduces the “people-centred” approach to border management expounded by the Danish Demining Group (DDG). DDG has worked in cross-border contexts in both East Africa and West Africa and the article compares its impact in each location, highlighting the community-first ethos of the organisation’s programming. Drawing on the lessons learned

Above: Community members and security providers in Lorengippi, Turkana, Kenya, participate in a dialogue hosted by the Danish Demining Group (August 2016).
from both regions, the article concludes with reflections on the strengths, successes and areas for improvement and expansion in people-centred border security and management.

**Borders and Borderlands in Africa: The Security Context**

A crucial feature of borderlands in Africa is the difference in how they are perceived by local people and the central government. For locals, the border or borders they live on or near are frequently hypothetical, without physical markers or regulatory presence. Pastoralist groups cross back and forth seeking – and sometimes fighting over – water and grazing lands for their herds; individuals cross to see family members, buy goods or access services; for businesspeople, borders present economic opportunities in trade routes, goods and markets. For central governments, on the other hand, borderlands are often viewed as places where their control over citizens is weak, illegal trade occurs and security threats from insurgent groups can enter their territory.

Accordingly, national border management policy tends to have a default aim of “hardening” borders: the building of “symbolic, legal, and material walls, fences, and frontiers”. 1

In many cases, however, especially between fragile or conflict-affected states, a lack of resources, capacity and/or will causes border management by the government to be weak and intermittent. What limited systems exist tend to concentrate on border posts rather than along whole border lines. State border security personnel are frequently undertrained and under-equipped for the level of challenges they encounter and, due to the remote nature of many of the locations in which they operate, face low levels of accountability for their actions. In combination, these factors...
can lead to the relationship between security providers and the communities they work within being one of resentment and suspicion, adding to, rather than mitigating, insecurity. In sum, borderlands in Africa are typically characterised by low state presence, mistrust between local communities and the state, and high levels of crime, insecurity and poverty.

This context is currently rising from national to global significance for three primary reasons. First, at present globally there is a high level of concern with international migration. People from Africa are a significant portion of those attempting to reach Europe in the so-called “refugee crisis” that began in 2014: interest is therefore developing, especially in European countries, around the part borders in Africa play in the movement of people. Second, borders are crucial components in terrorism and security dynamics with regard to insurgent movements; trafficking of arms, drugs and people; and smuggling. Extremist groups such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have a global profile; while they may or may not target border areas as such, low state presence, a lack of interstate cooperation and frequent marginalisation of cross-border ethnic groups do comprise environments where their operational capacity can strengthen. Third, especially in East African countries, recent discoveries of highly valuable natural resources, including oil, have caused the incentives for national governments to demarcate and police the outlying areas of their territory to spike. In addition, the development of large-scale cross-border infrastructure has become essential, often in territories that historically have received very little governmental attention. Examples of this include the Moyale area in the centre of the Kenya-Ethiopia border, and the Karamoja region that joins Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. In the former example, a major new highway between Isiolo and Addis Ababa is the most evident sign of a 2015 bilateral agreement to boost economic growth and pacify the region’s endemic livestock raids and political violence. In the latter example, the discovery of oil reserves in north-eastern Kenya and northern Uganda has drastic implications for national economic development plans, impacting projects such as the Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, a multi-billion dollar regional infrastructure investment. The development and

**A man rides in a donkey cart past Kenyan policemen as he crosses from Kenya into Somalia at the border town of Mandera.**

**IN ADDITION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE-SCALE CROSS-BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE HAS BECOME ESSENTIAL, OFTEN IN TERRITORIES THAT HISTORICALLY HAVE RECEIVED VERY LITTLE GOVERNMENTAL ATTENTION**
security implications of these dynamics by definition have international repercussions.

DDG’s Approach to Border Security and Management

DDG is a specialised unit within the Danish Refugee Council, working in humanitarian mine action and armed violence reduction. Its mission is to create safe environments where people can live free from armed violence and the remnants of conflict. DDG has delivered cross-border programmes in both East Africa and West Africa. Its approach to border security and management is distinctive in that it focuses on the security needs of local communities in borderland areas. As opposed to top-down, nationally oriented methods of policymaking, this people-centred stance works primarily to strengthen the capacity of borderland communities and their existing security providers to offer their own solutions to insecurity.

Three locations where DDG works that sustain protracted cross-border conflict are the northern Uganda-Kenya border; the meeting point of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, known as the Mandera Triangle; and the Liptako Gourma region of the Sahel, the borderlands between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The northern stretch of Uganda’s border with Kenya suffers from conflict driven by a culture of livestock raiding, low levels of law enforcement, a proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the illegal trade of various goods.5

Insecurity in the Mandera Triangle stems mainly from insurgent and terrorist activities by al-Shabaab, but there are also high levels of politically motivated ethnic conflict and violent competition among pastoral groups for resources.6 Liptako Gourma, meanwhile, is the site of armed disputes over sparse natural resources, banditry, various forms of trafficking and activities of extremist groups.7

West Africa

DDG works in 14 communities in the Liptako Gourma region, six in Burkina Faso, six in Mali and two in Niger. The focus of activities is on supporting an effective cross-border management system; strengthening the capacity of border authorities; improving communication and confidence between communities, security providers and local authorities; and providing youth with alternatives to crime and armed violence. These objectives were identified through a detailed needs assessment conducted by DDG field staff over two months in 2014.8 Border communities, security providers, local government and national government representatives were all consulted to establish a comprehensive view of the security context.

DDG has helped 13 of the 14 communities develop and implement safety plans through training or the provision of material. Communities have received conflict management education and risk education on small arms, landmines and...
explosives. Since the beginning of 2016, the programme has added livelihood activities, working specifically with women and youth associations. These activities contribute to income generation, reactivating markets and commercial activities in border areas, and meeting the needs expressed in the community safety plans. For security providers – the police, gendarmerie, customs officials and, in some cases, garde nationale and armed forces – training has been held in conflict analysis, conflict management and conflict prevention. To boost the practical capacity of border management, DDG provided equipment such as computers, printers and mobile phones to security providers, with the aim of supporting a communication network between security providers, authorities and community leaders. An activity to bridge the work with communities and security providers is the facilitation of dialogue between the two: 13 dialogue workshops and 47 fora have been held across 13 of the 14 communities where DDG is present.

In 2017, the programme is entering the cross-border phase, seeking to build on processes undertaken on each side of the border and initial cross-border meetings between authorities, in line with proposals from the community safety plans and dialogues. Where activities have previously been conducted in each country, the objective now is to establish cross-border community safety plans, cross-border dialogues between security providers and communities, and cross-border cooperation between security providers. These activities will be underpinned by tripartite meetings between authorities to evaluate programme achievements so far. A further step will be to strengthen conflict resolution mechanisms in the communities based on “third party neutral” (TPN) training, and to move from individual conflict management capacities towards the mediation of intercommunity and intracommunity conflicts by key actors in the community.

**East Africa**

Between October 2015 and March 2016, DDG delivered a pilot project called “Borderlands Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mandera Triangle and Karamoja Cluster” on the Kenya-Somalia and Kenya-Uganda borders. The overall focus of the pilot project was to create stronger relations between communities, security providers and local and national officials to strengthen security capacity. To achieve this, DDG took five foundational steps. First was a stakeholder mapping exercise to ascertain who should be
The information gathered during these consultations guided the remainder of DDG’s project. The third step was to use geographic information system mapping to capture and display visually the outputs from the stakeholder consultations, current conflict dynamics and trends, and past and present peace initiatives. These maps provided a valuable conflict analysis tool for security providers, communities and humanitarian actors alike. In addition, they formed the basis for multi-stakeholder dialogues about key challenges at local and national level.

THE NPR IS FORMED OF LOCAL COMMUNITY MEMBERS – UNTRAINED AND UNPAID, BUT ARMED AND LEGITIMISED BY THE STATE. THESE VOLUNTEERS ARE THEREFORE BOTH A POTENTIAL LIABILITY AND A POTENTIAL BEST SOLUTION WITH REGARD TO COMMUNITY SECURITY ISSUES

The two remaining steps were the most substantive. Fourth, DDG conducted capacity-building activities with local stakeholders. These activities included conflict management education for community members; advanced conflict management and conflict sensitivity training for security providers, administrators and community chiefs; and TPN mediation training for a range of government officials, civil society peace actors and security providers. On the Kenya-Uganda border, local drama groups gave performances on small arms sensitisation to nearly 8000 people. There and on the Kenyan side of the Kenya-Somalia border, a total of 45 local government officials and community leaders attended two-day workshops on alternatives to forced disarmament. In both locations, security providers, local authorities and community leaders were trained in community engagement, people-centred border management and differences in cultures and administrative systems.

The fifth and final step DDG took in this project was to facilitate two categories of dialogue: one between communities and security providers, and the other between high-level actors – politicians, administrators, senior security providers and civil society leaders. Dialogues between local communities and security providers were designed to build trust and understanding between the two, which typically was at a very low level. The rationale for this intervention is that low trust between the two groups is both a driver of conflict in itself and a brake on responses to conflict caused by other factors. Transparency and the explanation of priorities and behaviour were encouraged as a way of tackling the fear and antagonism that frequently characterised the relationship between the two groups. In the high-level dialogue meetings, topics addressed included improving cooperation in cross-border management, strengthening the security sector, supporting the voluntary disarming of civilians, promoting cross-border trade and livelihoods, and preventing and reintegrating youth from violent radicalisation.

Impact and Future of People-centred Border Management

In Liptako Gourma, a wealth of knowledge on security needs and capacities in borderlands has been made available through community safety plans, evaluation of activities, and regular contact with security providers. This type of knowledge should form the basis of advocacy, directly or indirectly, for national and regional policies to include community-based solutions and opportunities in border areas. In the meantime, community and security provider feedback on the dialogue fora is very positive, and there are indications that relations – and security – have improved. Dialogues have effectively brought stakeholders together to identify and discuss cross-border issues, and could grow in impact by producing concrete policies and initiatives to reduce, prevent and mitigate insecurity.

In East Africa, conflict management, conflict sensitivity and TPN trainings were highly appreciated by recipients. Even in Mandera – the largest town on Kenya’s border with Somalia and a place where al-Shabaab explicitly targets police and army personnel – security providers were eager to attend. The demand for such training far outstrips current supply. In Kenya, DDG’s programme revealed both the opportunity and risks presented by the main security provider, the National Police Reserves (NPR). The NPR is formed of local community members – untrained and unpaid, but armed and legitimised by the state. These volunteers are therefore both a potential liability and a potential best solution with regard to community security issues. Their training, command-and-control structure and deployment all have significant scope for improvement, and represents an opportunity for national- and local-level interests around border security to converge. Another such opportunity is in cultural awareness training for state security providers, which is currently insufficient.

Dialogues between communities and security providers are economical and highly effective in building trust, understanding and cooperation. DDG learned that the dialogue format was independently replicated by warrior groups on either side of the Kenya-Uganda border, demonstrating the potential and appeal of the initiative. High-level meetings were found to be very effective at bringing decision-makers together and creating consensus.
around security issues. As in West Africa, their impact could be maximised by improving their capacity to implement the policies they agree on. The exclusion of traditional leaders – such as village elders – from contemporary security management was also revealed to be a noteworthy factor that could be positively addressed to help reduce tensions between communities.

Conclusion
The lessons drawn from the case studies in this article contribute to a growing appreciation of what must happen to achieve effective cross-border security management. Each stakeholder – from local communities to regional government bodies – has a role to play in the ongoing work to improve security in borderlands.

Regional and national governments have a responsibility to invest in cross-border infrastructure and institutions. Border posts should be built and staffed with customs, security and immigration officials trained in border management, cultural sensitivity and data collection. In addition, countries should conduct joint patrols along border lines. Local governments, meanwhile, are best placed to balance the needs of borderlands communities with national interests. In practice, this means providing and supporting cross-border access to goods and services, creating investment and employment opportunities in border regions, and advocating for the interests of cross-border communities at the national and regional levels. Crucially, local government must also exercise strict control and accountability over security providers.

Non-governmental and civil society organisations have roles to play in training and educating security providers and local communities alike on topics from arms control to migration. They should concentrate on developing borderlands through building local capacity in communications, access to goods and services, livelihoods and advocacy for human rights. These organisations should ensure they are supporting local security, livelihoods and advocacy mechanisms rather than imposing external ones; their research and monitoring capabilities are useful in this regard. Borderlands communities themselves, meanwhile, have responsibilities as well as rights in ensuring their security and prosperity. They must ensure that their definitions of needs are inclusive of all parts of the community, especially those who may have less of a voice, such as women or young people. Community leaders must take the lead in building positive relations with neighbouring communities and security providers alike, and provide support to civil society organisations and initiatives.

These recommendations for people-centred border management are underpinned by a fundamental principle – shared by a growing number of actors, including the African Union Border Programme – that policy agendas for border areas must coincide with the interests of the people who live there. Secure and open borders that aid, rather than hinder, the people who live on and around them, are the best and indeed only option for long-term security and development at national and regional level. For this to be achieved, the voices, needs, capacities and initiatives of local borderlands communities must be central to border policy across Africa.

Dominic Naish works for the Danish Demining Group (DDG) in East Africa, focusing on knowledge management and cross-border programming.

Endnotes
4 For more information, visit <http://www.lapsset.go.ke/>
9 Harris, Simon (2016) Borderlands Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mandera Triangle and Karamoja Cluster: Lessons Learned Report. Nairobi: Danish Demining Group, p. 10. DDG undertook extra security precautions in delivering training to security forces in Mandera, but recognises that security threats may necessitate a change in methodology in this or other high-risk contexts in future.
SUPPRESSING THE REVIVAL OF CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE THROUGH INCLUSIVE NATIONAL DIALOGUE

BY CLAYTON HAZVINEI VHUMBUNU

Introduction

The year 2016 witnessed the intensification of conflict in Mozambique – albeit in a sporadic fashion – mainly between the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front/Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) government, presided over by President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, and Mozambican National Resistance/Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) forces, led by Alfonso Marceta Macacho Dhlakama. This is a continuation of the conflict that was revived in 2012 by Renamo, driven by several grievances including allegations of economic marginalisation, regional economic imbalances and breach of the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords (GPA) – which had ended the post-independence civil war fought from 1977 to 1992. The escalation of conflict in Mozambique in early 2016 resulted in the displacement of citizens in the affected areas, whilst thousands of people crossed the borders into Malawi and eastern Zimbabwe as refugees.¹

This article assesses the latest conflict developments in Mozambique and identifies the critical underlying issues driving the conflict. The article recommends that a formally structured all-stakeholder inclusive national dialogue platform (INDP) be established to discuss the identified critical issues and formulate possible interventions that can be adopted to suppress the conceivable resurgence of civil conflict.

Above: The ruling Frelimo government of Mozambique is presided over by President Felipe Nyusi.
war in Mozambique. This will lay the basis for an effective and sustainable mediation process.

**Mozambique’s Civil War and Post-civil War Conflict Dynamics**

The post-independence civil war in Mozambique took place from 1977 to 1992, after the country attained its independence from the Portuguese colonial administration in June 1975. The civil war started when Renamo was formed by the Central Intelligence Organisation of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), after then-president Samora Moisés Machel started supporting the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (Zanla) in its armed struggle against Rhodesia. Initially, Renamo was a collection of Frelimo dissidents and those soldiers who had fought together with the Portuguese during the colonial struggle, and was reportedly funded and supported by Rhodesia, apartheid South Africa, Portugal, West Germany, the United States (US) and Malawi. After 1992, Renamo transformed from being a rebel movement into a political party, led by Dhlakama – successor to a former Frelimo soldier, André Matsangaissa, who had died in 1979.

Since 1994, Frelimo has won all elections, and Renamo has consistently contested the outcome of the elections and threatened violence over allegations of electoral fraud and manipulation. Electoral complaints, as well as socio-economic and political grievances, led to the re-emergence of conflict in 2012.

**The Re-emergence of Conflict in Mozambique (2012–2016)**

The period between 1992 and 2012 witnessed subdued conflict. From 2012 to 2016, the conflict intensified, with Renamo alleging that the government was unwilling to address its demands – which include electoral reforms, the integration of its forces into the national army, greater representation in the institutions of the state, addressing allegations of state corruption, the depoliticisation of state institutions, the autonomy of provinces under Renamo “control”, and the equitable sharing of national resources. By August 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there were 12 000 Mozambican refugees in Malawi, Zimbabwe had received about 4000 Mozambican refugees by September 2016, whilst others fled to South Africa and Tanzania.

**Mediation Efforts: Actors, Issues and State of Negotiations**

In June 2016, the Mozambican government agreed to the assistance of international mediators to negotiate peace, and dialogue resumed in July 2016. These mediators were from Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, the European Union (EU), Britain, the Vatican and the Catholic Church. A joint commission, with representatives from Renamo and Frelimo, was set up to engender favourable conditions for the conduct of meetings between President Nyusi and Dhlakama, and facilitate the cessation of violence.

The issues under negotiation included:

- Renamo’s demands for “province autonomy”, or control of six out of 11 Mozambican provinces (Manica, Nampula, Niassa, Sofala, Tete and Zambezia);
- the cessation of military action;
- the restructuring of the Mozambican Defence Armed Forces/Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM);
- the reintegration of Renamo forces into the national army, and their inclusion in senior ranks of the army;
- the reinsertion of Renamo forces into society; and
- a separation between public administration and political parties.

The international mediators left in December 2016, amid little progress reported on the issues under discussion. The EU representative hinted that “they would return if they
received an express invitation from the Joint Commission”. However, conflict continued, with incidences such as the December 2016 attack on a Beira-bound train loaded with coal for export in Sofala, as well as the reported Renamo-government forces clashes in January 2017. These clashes occurred despite an announcement on 3 January 2017 – made by Dhlakama and endorsed by Nyusi – of a 60-day ceasefire.

Towards an Inclusive and Transformative Dialogue: Key Issues to Consider

The mediation of talks between Renamo and Frelimo may not be the best way forward to resolve the larger-than-political party issues at stake, as it reduces the talks to elite bargaining and politicised consensus-building. An inclusive process is needed, whereby all citizens, through various representative associations, are provided a platform for comprehensive discussions that should culminate in concrete proposals and strategies to be considered for adoption and implementation by the government, so as to sustainably address the underlying issues of conflict. Dialogue should allow for genuine interaction and the exchange of different perspectives on the conflict, and can foster the countrywide consensus necessary for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

A formally structured INDP should be established, comprising all political parties, civil society organisations (CSOs), academia, labour, business, religious organisations and all representative stakeholders in Mozambique. The INDP should be mandated with four principal responsibilities: (1) to comprehensively identify the underlying issues driving the Mozambican conflict; (2) to exchange ideas and strategies on the way forward; (3) to develop short-term and long-term intervention proposals that will be considered for adoption and implementation by the government; and (4) to establish an institutional framework for the monitoring, evaluation and review of the implementation of INDP interventions. This will lay the ground for a more sustainable mediation process.

The proposed INDP should have an expanded discussion framework that transcends Dhlakama’s demands. The following key thematic issues should be prioritised and considered for discussion by the proposed INDP.

Inclusive Economic Growth and Development Agenda

The ongoing conflict may be viewed as a symptom of various challenges facing Mozambique as a country.
Whilst the decentralisation of the six provinces merits discussion, mediators should facilitate a broader dialogue that prioritises an economic transformation agenda. The INDP should exchange ideas on how Mozambique can establish capable institutions and comprehensive strategies to harness its resource potential and comparative economic advantage for the benefit of its people.

At the core of dialogue should be the grand question on how to revive and transform the post-conflict economy in Mozambique. In his article “Mozambique: ‘The War Ended 17 Years Ago, but We are Still Poor’”, Joseph Hanlon argues that economic management strategies in post-civil war Mozambique exacerbated inequality and social exclusion, thereby creating a “serious risk of conflict”. Extreme poverty, poor service provision by government, high unemployment and horizontal and vertical inequalities are obvious conflict ingredients all over the world.

Whilst the country has been listed as one of the six African countries (in addition to Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania) that make up the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world, this growth has largely been statistical. There have been substantial investments in the country’s resource sectors. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report of 2016 ranks Mozambique as the second-largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) after South Africa for the period between 2010 and 2015. Investments were received mostly in its mining sector, as Mozambique is endowed with huge quantities of aluminium, coal, gold, graphite, ilmenite, iron and steel, limestone, natural gas, rutile, tantalum, titanium and zircon, among other minerals. All this has not substantially transformed lives and livelihoods in Mozambique.

Although the Standard Bank Group projected that liquefied natural gas in Mozambique will generate US$39 billion for the economy over the next 20 years from 2015, and increase the country’s gross domestic product per capita by almost 700% by the year 2035 – from US$605 to US$4,500 – whilst creating 700 000 jobs within the same period,14 all these projections may fail to be realised if proper and appropriate systems and institutions are not put in place. The World Bank’s economic outlook for Mozambique in 2016 stated:

The adult literacy rate is 56%, and average life expectancy at birth is 50.3 years. Mozambique faces other challenges such as increasing malnutrition, and stunting. Malaria remains the most common cause of death, responsible for 35% of child mortality and 29% for the general population […] The social progress index for access to improved sources of water and sanitation ranks Mozambique 128th and 119th respectively out of 135 countries. Indeed, Mozambique has one of the lowest levels of water consumption in the world despite being endowed with a variety of water sources.15

Since factors such as frequent floods, cyclones, droughts and plummeting global mineral commodity prices have also contributed to the economic challenges facing Mozambique, it is prudent that the proposed INDP should engage in
discussions around identifying strategies that the country can adopt to cushion itself from natural calamities and the vagaries of global commodity markets. The proposed INDP should therefore discuss progressive economic development alternatives and models that are capable of transforming the Mozambican economy in a manner that delivers broad-based and inclusive socio-economic development, so as to create conditions for national harmony, peace and stability.

Decentralisation

Renamo’s priority demand, made in September 2015 – and which remains contentious – is the clamour for “provincial autonomy”, or control of six out of 11 Mozambican provinces (see Table 1) on the basis of the 2014 election outcome. Dhlakama argues that this is the only way to resolve electoral disputes and ensure development in these regions. It is worthwhile to understand the outcome of the 2014 national assembly and provincial elections.

Table 1: Provincial distribution of National Assembly seats in Mozambique (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>MDM (Democratic Movement of Mozambique)</th>
<th>Renamo</th>
<th>Frelimo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambezia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tete</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo Province</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo City</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>89</strong></td>
<td><strong>144</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that Africa and Europe in the above table are two single-member constituencies that represent Mozambican citizens in Africa and Europe.

Table 1 indicates that Frelimo got 144 National Assembly seats and Renamo got 89 seats, whilst the MDM garnered 17 seats. In terms of provincial distribution, Frelimo got the majority seats in seven provinces – Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Tete, Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo City and Maputo Province – in addition to the Africa and Europe constituencies. Renamo gained majority seats in only two provinces – Zambezia and Sofala. Thus, it can be difficult to conclude that Dhlakama/Renamo controls six out of Mozambique’s 11 provinces.

Decentralisation should not be used as a “foot-in-the-door” technique to eventually clamour for regional secession or separation.

Proceeding from this faulty and misleading premise will jeopardise the decentralisation dialogue, which should be developmental in orientation and outlook. Decentralisation should not be used as a “foot-in-the-door” technique to eventually clamour for regional secession or separation. Instead, discussions on the choice, structure, framework and form of decentralisation should espouse the spirit and philosophy of national unity, integration, cohesion, democratisation and the enhancement of social service delivery. In this regard, INDP stakeholders can draw from the successes, limits and challenges faced after the adoption of the Decentralised Planning and Financing Project in 2014.

Reintegration of Renamo Combatants

Scholars have debated whether Mozambique can be regarded as a success story of post-civil war stabilisation. Whilst maintaining that post-civil war peacebuilding in Mozambique showed progress after 1992, Reppell et al have argued that the “incomplete implementation of some of its peacebuilding needs resulted in continuous recurrences of violence and threats to the overall stability of the country”. Thus, it is critical to allow the proposed INDP to discuss the issues of reintegration, demobilisation benefits for (and reinsertion of) Renamo forces, and inclusion of these forces in the national police and intelligence services. Practically, this may be a complex demand when one considers the sensitivities of such security apparatus in any country. Discussions should consider training and development, integrated psychosocial support, capacity-building and community development projects through the assistance of civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other actors with a view to fully restore mutual trust, community acceptance and recognition among Renamo forces and government. In this regard, the proposed INDP should learn lessons from the limitations of the post-1992 disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) initiatives.

Public Sector Reforms and Electoral Reforms

The demand by Renamo for the government to facilitate the separation between public administration and political party is progressive. Fredson Guilengue refers to this...
politicisation of public institutions as the “Frelimization of the state”, arguing that government officials and their families have their influence in state institutions, the national economy, and the media. This conflation compromises the rule of law, accountability, and anti-corruption control; threatens meritocracy in public administration; breeds patronage; affects the separation of powers; and erodes public trust and confidence in public institutions. All these create unnecessary tensions, polarisation, and ultimately, conflict. The proposed INDP should establish the state of public sector management in Mozambique, identify challenges and discuss policy reform proposals.

Regarding electoral reform, the proposed INDP should analyse the election processes that have been conducted so far in Mozambique to establish an electoral reform agenda. The latest election observer mission reports as well as media reports may be helpful.

As previously indicated, all election observer missions deployed to Mozambique reported that the October 2014 elections were free, fair, transparent, and credible, thereby endorsing its outcome. However, if one analyses the observer missions’ reports, it is clear that there is still scope to improve the country’s electoral processes in terms of policy, regulations, and law. For example, the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and the EU observer teams’ recommendations included the need to involve CSOs in voter education, early accessibility of the voter’s roll, simplification of election results processing and tabulation, electoral transparency, review of the laws regulating political campaigns, impartiality in law and order maintenance by police, prohibition of the use of public resources in election campaigning, and the amending of electoral laws guiding election appeals. The proposed INDP might use this as a basis to identify any gaps within the existing electoral system, so as to highlight areas in need of reform.

**Conclusion**

Against a background of escalating conflict in Mozambique, it has been argued that limiting mediation and discussions exclusively to Frelimo and Renamo may

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The new Mozambican assembly takes office in Maputo on 12 January 2015 without any representation from the main opposition party Renamo. Afonso Dhlakama, the Renamo leader, refused to accept the results of the October 2014 elections won by the ruling Frelimo party, claiming widespread irregularities and fraud.
not ensure sustainable conflict prevention and resolution. Thus, it has been suggested that a multi-stakeholder INDP be established to comprehensively discuss the four key issues of inclusive economic growth and development, decentralisation, reintegration of Renamo forces, and public sector and electoral reforms. The outcome of the INDP discussions should then be considered for formal adoption and implementation by government, so as to suppress the renewal of civil war in Mozambique. This will lay the basis for an effective and sustainable mediation process. As John Packer noted, “[U]ltimately, inclusive processes are better processes, [they facilitate] more informed deliberations, broader and deeper concurrence, resulting in more implementable and sustainable agreements.”

Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu is a Lecturer and PhD Candidate in International Relations at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban, South Africa. He is also an Associate Researcher with the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) in Harare, Zimbabwe.

Endnotes
6 Domingos, Arimando (2016) op. cit.
17 Ibid.
EMERGING DIVERSITY IN SECURITY PRACTICES IN KENYA’S DEVELPED CONSTITUTION

BY DOMINIC BURBIDGE

The Fourth Schedule of Kenya’s 2010 constitution places police services and the courts firmly in the hands of the national government, leaving county governments without any such powers. However, subsequent to promulgation of the constitution, Kenya’s parliament passed the National Police Service Act 2011 (amended 2014), which in section 41 created county policing authorities to, inter alia, “develop proposals on priorities, objectives and targets for police performance in the county”, “monitor trends and patterns of crime in the county” and “promote community policing initiatives” [section 41 (9) (a-c)]. In general, county policing authorities are “a way for the community to get involved in policing at the local level”.

On face value, the provisions of the National Police Service Act provide much less authority than what many governors asked for. Governors have been vocal in demanding that policing become a function of devolved government. Their reasons include:

1. the role governors play and intend to play in reconciling inter-ethnic differences and conflict;
2. recognition among governors of the priority security has for voters’ perceptions of county government performance; and
3. resentment at the way policing structures can and may be used by actors within central
government to circumvent local development plans, local aspirations for inter-ethnic harmony, or local enforcement of free and fair elections.

It can be speculated that a further, negative reason may exist: local control of security might allow governors to themselves manipulate political events and inter-ethnic relations to their advantage. The history of a centralised state in Kenya manipulating local elections through the arm of security is well established. Mai Hassan measured the cross-district effect of Daniel arap Moi’s government posting its own security officials in elections between 1992 and 2002, and found that the appointed officials’ ethnic similarity or difference to the local area significantly affected that area's vote share in favour of the president.

Push and pull between security personnel and local political representatives over who is in charge locally has continued even more intensely with the advent of devolution. Neither the constitution nor recent legislation have been able to establish a hierarchy that says which position has final authority in cases of overlap or dispute. Hassan explains:

Beginning in 2011, parliament debated legislation related to the PA [Provincial Administration] that seemed to follow the constitution's spirit of weakening executive power. Early in the transition period, the PA was scrapped entirely and replaced with a new national government administrative system, the National Administration (NA). […] While Kenya’s new national government structure abolishes the province level (and by definition PCs [Provincial Commissioners]), the NA creates a new administrative post of County Commissioner (CC) at the county level alongside the new elected county governors. […] At first, the 2012 County Governments Bill specified that NA officials should report directly to the county governor and not the president. This was to ensure that the NA would “respect the system of devolved government” that the constitution mandated and would weaken executive power as the population envisioned.

Contrary to these initial intentions, the finalised County Government Act of 2012 made no such comment on the relationship between county commissioners and governors, meaning that the legal relationship remains the same as stipulated in the 2010 constitution – that each performs duties pertaining to their respective functions, concurrently over the same territory. The ambiguity this causes was anticipated to some extent in section 17 of the constitution’s Sixth Schedule, which demanded the restructuring of the provincial administration to “accord with and respect the system of devolved government” within five years of the constitution’s promulgation. Despite this requirement, central government did not wish to restructure security in
a way that would make governors look to be in ultimate control locally. On the other hand, a clear statement of the superiority of county commissioners would run the risk of creating an unwelcome level of opposition across the country towards the Jubilee government. This seemingly irreconcilable tension means the status quo of concurrent activities and legal ambiguity is likely to endure in the medium to long term. In a politically contested environment, apart from contestation over whether to bring security to the local level, strong divisions also exist over how to do this. This article provides an overview of how security reforms are playing out in four county case studies, and argues that a high level of diversity in the state-society relationship is emerging.

Four Case Studies

While there is nominal clarity over security not being a devolved function of government, historically the Kenyan government has struggled to provide security evenly across the country. The situation creates political tensions where local stakeholders feel the need to advocate for a security apparatus more in line with community self-perceptions. Because the very performance of security services further depends on cooperative and communicative relations with the population, the implementation of constitutional provisions has struggled to adapt to local community diversities. Under these conditions, it is impossible to fully understand the developments at play without direct engagement with county-level case studies reflective of nationwide differences. The four counties of Lamu, Garissa, Machakos and Isiolo are used as examples.

Lamu County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Issa Timamy (United Democratic Forum Party; Swahili ethnicity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of votes won above second-place gubernatorial candidate</td>
<td>4.5%5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County commissioner</td>
<td>(Deputy) Fredrick Ndambuki (currently acting county commissioner; Kamba ethnicity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority party in county assembly</td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Between 15 and 17 June 2014, al-Shabaab killed approximately 68 people in the areas of Mpeketoni, Majembeni and Poromoko of Lamu County as part of a general retaliation against Kenya’s 2011 intervention into Somalia. During early speculation over the cause of the attack, President Uhuru Kenyatta declared that it was “politically motivated ethnic violence against a Kenyan community [and] not an Al-Shabaab terrorist attack”. There is ongoing concern over the overlap between inter-ethnic relations and terrorism in Lamu, which means that Kenyatta’s statement, although incorrect, reflects wider concerns over title deeds and inter-ethnic disagreement surrounding Kikuyu settlements in Lamu.

These political divisions, and the president’s problematic framing of the situation, led Governor Issa Timamy of Lamu to be placed under trial for involvement in the terrorist activities that targeted Kikuyu around Mpeketoni. Although charges were subsequently dropped, the case represents a harrowing example of direct intervention by national government into devolved government on grounds of security. The particular vulnerability of Timamy is, in part, due to the ethnic diversity of his county, which renders his electoral position tenuous and adds controversy over the ethnicity of appointed security officers. The single largest ethnic group in Lamu County is the Swahili, who constitute 30% of the local population. Recent analysis estimates that the governor, who is also Swahili, has appointed a county executive committee of 70% Swahili composition. This makes the Lamu county government the single most over-representative of its local ethnic majority among all county governments of Kenya. As such, combined justifications of central government intervention on grounds...
Garissa County stretches on its eastern side across the Kenya-Somali frontier, and to its south borders the county of Lamu. The porous and contested nature of the Kenya-Somali border, combined with growing politicisation of the identity of ethnic Somalis across the country, renders Garissa a charged environment for the growth of terrorism and cross-border raids. Despite all this, the county has only one Kenya Police and one Administration Police office. The population of the county is 79.6% of Somali ethnicity, which is also the ethnicity of Governor Nathif Adan and, it is estimated, his entire county executive committee. The county’s proximity to Somalia means the relationship between security and devolved government is tenuous and under heightened scrutiny. In 2014, Deputy President William Ruto stated that the central government could suspend the Marsabit county government – which is in a similar situation to Garissa – over failures to provide security. There, rivalry had been brewing between the governor and a local member of parliament, which “followed the lines of long-standing tensions between Gabbra and Boran, leading to an outbreak of violence”. Central government suspension of a county government can take place under the powers established in section 192 of the constitution. The provision leaves governors of harder-to-reach areas of the country somewhat at the mercy of national government sentiment, even though throughout their term in office governors have no constitutional power to directly affect how security is deployed in their area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Garissa County</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governor</strong></td>
<td>Nathif Adan (Wiper Democratic Movement-Kenya; Somali ethnicity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of votes</strong></td>
<td>3.1%13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>won above second</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>place gubernatorial</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>candidate</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>County commissioner</strong></td>
<td>Njenga Miiri (suspended; Kikuyu ethnicity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Majority party in</strong></td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>county assembly</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than 75% of the population of Garissa County is of Somali ethnicity.
Following the Garissa University killings in 2015, the central government responded with closer scrutiny of its security forces operating in the county.

In September 2014, the Garissa regional passport office was closed by order of Major-General (Rtd) Gordon Kihalangwa, despite local outcry.19 On 2 April 2015, 147 members of Garissa University College were killed in a raid by al-Shabaab, widely reported on by the international media.20 In contrast to the politicisation of the Lamu County government, the central government responded with scrutiny of its security forces operating in the county, in a way that was more appropriately self-critical and reflective. Seven high-ranking police officers were suspended following an inquiry into the failed security response.21 Further, interior secretary Joseph Nkaisserry also suspended Ernest Munyi, the north-eastern regional coordinator, and Njenga Miiri, county commissioner of Garissa.22 Miiri was previously county commissioner of Lamu, although there are conflicting accounts over whether he was in office in Lamu over the course of the Mpeketoni attacks. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) described him as such, although local media sources have it that Miiri was immediately deployed to replace county commissioner Stephen Ikua as the scale of the attacks became known, which is why his appearance at many media events following the Mpeketoni attacks made some outlets describe him as Lamu county commissioner during the events.23 This complication notwithstanding, Miiri’s fraught reputation, together with controversy over his comments that the internally displaced persons produced by the Lamu attacks were mostly “imposters”,24 helped the central government see a need to reform security provision in Garissa following the university killings. As a report by the International Crisis Group explains, following the attacks “north-eastern leaders proposed many recommendations directly to the president, notably appointing an overarching regional coordinator, replacing the three county commissioners [of Mandera, Wajir and Garissa] and deploying more security forces, mostly drawn from the local population”.25 Initial resistance to such proposed changes was made by the central government over fears that it would set a precedent of allowing synergy between devolved structures of governance and national security provision. Instead, Kenya’s north-east is preferred to be framed by the central government as exceptionally lawless, in fear of the region’s history of secession demands.26 The reality, however, is that by replacing security officials with those more locally attuned, positive in-roads have been made in quelling al-Shabaab.
Machakos County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Alfred Mutua (Wiper Democratic Movement-Kenya; Kamba ethnicity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of votes won above second-place gubernatorial candidate</td>
<td>45.0%²⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County commissioner</td>
<td>Ann Gakuria (Kikuyu ethnicity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority party in county assembly</td>
<td>Wiper Democratic Movement-Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Touted as one of the most entrepreneurial and successful cases of devolution, Machakos County has focused on numerous highly visible public service expansions since the 2013 election. Under Governor Alfred Mutua, the county government has treated security in a way almost equivalent to any other area of county-level public service provision. This has meant organising procurements tailored to suit the needs of security and police services that operate in the county, and maximising the visibility of these procurements as brought about by the county government. Apart from purchases of 500 closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras and 40 police dogs, in a highly publicised event Mutua unveiled 120 police cars for use within the county.²⁸ Subsequently, Mutua financed the construction of houses for security officers.²⁹ This direct involvement in security provision is in flagrant disregard of the constitution’s demarcation of security as a function of national government. However, the slickness of Mutua’s media campaign has meant almost no coverage or debate over its unconstitutionality.³⁰ Indeed, KTN, one of the most respected news channels in Kenya, avoided any admonishment and instead described the purchases as meaning “Machakos County could have a big head start in security compared to the other 46 counties”.³¹ Mutua justified the purchases by framing security provision as a duty in which all Kenyans should be involved, emphasising that “security is not a national government or county government issue only. I am asking all of us to discourage crime by not buying goods they know or suspect are stolen and also to identify and report criminals in their neighbourhood to the authorities.”³² In this way, he tactfully employed reference to the neighbourhood watch scheme (known as nyumba kumi), organised by national government, to give the impression of promoting the national government agenda. Some queries were raised by the auditor-general over the procurement processes of vehicles by the county government.³³ However, giving the specific recommendation that “[s]ince the duty of security provision is primarily the National Government, the purpose for which the ninety one (91) vehicles were provided to the police should be clearly stated”.³⁴ However, the concerns only led to further requests for documentation,³⁵ not any fundamental questioning of the constitutionality of a county government operating through a memorandum of understanding with the police force.

In terms of county government budgeting, the purchases were made as part of a labelled “Machakos Comprehensive Security and Emergency Program”.³⁶ As such, vehicles came already painted; their branding of “Police/Machakos County” giving Mutua credit in the eyes of voters whenever the cars are on patrol. Machakos senator Johnstone Muthama has been a frequent critic of Mutua on this and many other areas. However, Mutua has thus far remained immunised from such criticism, due to his positive media profile and fruitful relations with county commissioner Ann Gakuria, who stands to benefit in terms of greater resources put at her disposal for the work of policing. Gakuria’s firm relationship with Mutua was publicly heralded by Johnstone Kavuludi, chairman of the National Police Service. The good relations Mutua enjoys are completed by his strong links with the incumbent Jubilee Coalition national government. From 2004 to 2012, Mutua was the government spokesperson and public communications secretary, and retains a highly visible presence in national media.

Isiolo County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Godana Doyo Adhi (United Republican Party; Borana ethnicity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of votes won above second-place gubernatorial candidate</td>
<td>6.6%²⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County commissioner</td>
<td>Wanyama Musiambo (Luhya ethnicity); George Natembeya (Luhya ethnicity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority party in county assembly</td>
<td>United Republican Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Historically, Isiolo has suffered frequent and sometimes ruinous intercommunal violence. The county hosts the Meru, Samburu, Turkana, Gabra, Somali and Borana ethnic groups – the single largest group being the Borana (at 36.9%), followed by the Somali.³⁸ Violence was particularly intense between 2009 and 2012, with causes including political campaigns oriented towards ethnic voter bases; land disagreements, removals and elite-led purchases; cattle rustling; and security vacuums leading to pre-emptive intercommunal violence through the proliferation of small arms.
Despite these trends, initial interaction between security services and devolved government in Isiolo promoted leadership sensitive to the needs of local communities. The governor of Isiolo, Godana Doyo Adhi, is of Borana ethnicity, and came to office together with running-mate Mohamed Guleid, a Somali, as deputy governor. As representatives of the two largest groups of the county, the alliance promoted inter-ethnic solidarity between the two communities. Further, the county government enjoyed strong and supportive relations with county commissioner Wanyama Musiambo, who as a Luhy is not of any of the ethnic communities dominating politics in the county. Behind the scenes, Doyo and Guleid facilitated ongoing consultations with elders of locally dominant tribes, which helped foster some sense of inclusion and collaboration. The county government openly describes security as its number-one priority, which also links with its aspiration to act as a key hub for the transport of oil and goods to the Lamu port, as part of Kenya’s Vision 2030.

The attempt to guarantee security for local residents has, however, been severely challenged by a boundary dispute with Meru County to the south. The boundary dispute involves a complicated plethora of competing claims – ranging from land disputes surrounding the town of Isiolo, access to sand extraction for construction and access to grazing land for cattle, to competing demands over the location of a proposed airport. The business and livelihood interests that surround these issues have encouraged a stoking of political rhetoric among Isiolo and Meru politicians, and the mobilisation of residents and youth groups. In October 2015, clashes resulted in six deaths, with violence erupting again only a few days later in protest at the death of a motorbike taxi operator. This mainly involved confrontational exchanges between members of the Borana and Meru ethnic communities. The ensuing chaos involved the looting of shops and blocking of the Isiolo–Nanyuki highway, and was only brought to a close with the deployment of the military’s 78th Tank Battalion, stationed nearby. In response, the member of county assembly for Bula Pesa, Moses Kithinji; chief officer for trade, Hudson Kinyua; and ward administrator for Bula Pesa, Witherford Mwirigi, were arrested under charges of inciting youth to violent protests.

In the first half of the political term, relations were therefore broadly speaking positive between Isiolo politicians and the county commissioner. However, with a county commissioner change from Wanyama Musiambo to George Natembeya, these relations have run into difficulty. Natembeya has made explicit a shoot-to-kill policy towards those in the county carrying arms illegally, which comes across as high-handed, presumptuous and out of touch. The commissioner demonstrated some support for the aims of Isiolo politicians in April 2016, by arresting 40 Meru protestors who were attempting to block contractors from completing a water supply project for Isiolo town. However, relations deteriorated again when a widely reported complaint about the standards of healthcare provision in Isiolo’s referral hospital prompted Natembeya to carry out an inspection of the facility, which Doyo interpreted as something of an encroachment on county government duties and a shaming of county government performance. Doyo confronted Natembeya in the hospital and ejected him, even though visiting and inspecting government-owned buildings are among commissioners’ legitimate duties. When elders of Isiolo reacted to the confrontation, they stressed a need for “clear separation of powers between the county government officials and representatives of the national government”.

Conclusion

There is a clear separation of powers between security services and local politics, according to the constitution: governors are not to manage law and order. The problem comes with the history of an uneven security presence across Kenya – meaning that, in fact, it is next to impossible for governors to ignore the security concerns of their local residents. Alongside advocacy for constitutional reform that would give them greater say over security provision, therefore, governors are active in the politics surrounding local security provision. On the one hand, this tends to bruise relations with county commissioners and the central government, because governors easily politicise matters and can often be in support of particular ethnic communities at the expense of others. On the other hand, however, the new situation is forcing security services at least to acknowledge local diversities and the value of more community-inclusive law and order strategies.

Dr Dominic Burbidge is a member of the Faculty of Law at the University of Oxford, and a Research Fellow at the London-based think tank Policy Exchange.

Endnotes

5 Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (2013) ‘Summary of Results for Governor, 2013’, Available at: <http://www.iebc.or.ke>
26 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
Introduction

In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), rural electrification is being proffered by the oldest national park on the continent as a pathway for economic development and conflict reduction. The 400 kW Mutsora hydroelectric facility, located in Mutwanga village in eastern Beni territory, North Kivu province, provides power to approximately 450 homes and businesses. The project is implemented by Virunga National Park (VNP) and the broader public-private sector Virunga Alliance, which together are targeting investments in hydroelectric power, microfinance, fisheries, tourism and agricultural transformation industries. The Mutsora hydroelectric facility is one of two completed facilities in North Kivu – the other being a 13.2 MW hydroelectric facility in Rutshuru territory. Construction on a third hydroelectric facility – of 11.6 MW in Lubero territory – was underway as of July 2016.

Above: A boy walks with an oil lamp through the streets of a village in North Kivu province. A large part of Congolese people have no access, or minimal access, to electricity.
Hydroelectric power is generated by using moving water to turn one or more turbines. The Mutsora hydroelectric facility – as with all facilities planned and implemented by VNP and partners – is a “run-of-the-river” facility, where no dam or reservoir is created. A portion of the river’s flow is diverted into a canal, run downhill to the turbines and then returned to the riverbed downstream. These kinds of facilities are cited as having less environmental impact than a dam- and reservoir-based electrical generation system.¹

The basic theory of change relating to these hydroelectric development projects is that electricity provision can lead to a suite of job and income-generation opportunities previously unavailable; increased employment can lead to both improvements in household and community well-being, as well as decreased participation in armed groups; and greater civilian well-being and fewer armed group combatants reduce particular pressures on the park, leading to improved conservation outcomes. This article addresses the first linkage in this theory of change – that the availability of electricity can lead to job creation – and explores other contributions (community and household well-being) through the Mutsora hydrofacility case study.

This article offers a conceptual background that discusses the context for this case study in the eastern DRC; the research methods utilised during our data collection; study results and discussion in terms of socio-economic outcomes for service institutions, households, small businesses and the agricultural transformation industry; and our conclusions.

Conceptual Background

Protracted conflict in the eastern DRC has long been fuelled by poor governance, ethnic tensions, land conflict, poverty, competing international interests and corrupt power relationships. For VNP, a World Heritage Site and one of the most ecologically rich, protected areas in the world, these regional dynamics present particular challenges. There are intense local and international demands for resources in the park, rebel groups that confront VNP rangers and take refuge inside the park, and local communities which see VNP as partly responsible for their social protection and economic advancement.

For decades, the DRC government has failed to provide either basic services or an enabling environment for economic opportunity to the majority of its citizens, and it has failed to prioritise good governance over corrupt self-interests that directly facilitate ongoing conflict. Non-governmental and other international organisations have stepped in to equip and staff area hospitals, build schools and public water access, develop agricultural extension programmes and manage population displacement during conflict, among other services. VNP – itself managed by DRC’s national parks’ authority,
the *Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature* (ICCN) – is emerging as a regional leader by engaging in the implementation of community development projects in North Kivu, and providing an example of a way forward for other government entities in the DRC. Investment in infrastructure – in particular, renewable energy infrastructure – as community development is a new approach for a national park anywhere; it is even more novel for a park located directly in a region plagued by violent conflict, in one of the poorest countries in the world.

Mutwanga village is located in eastern Beni territory in North Kivu province, about 40 kilometres by road from the Kasindi border crossing into Uganda. The village sits at the base of the western slopes of the Rwenzori Mountains and just outside the border of VNP. The Mutsora run-of-the-river mini hydroelectric facility is located inside the park near the VNP ranger station, and electricity distribution reaches a service area of about 4250 households. Historically, the community has had several small-scale hydroelectric projects, but the service area and capacity of these projects has been extremely limited. While there is some household and business electricity connectivity via public and private generators, the vast majority of the population has not had access to electricity.

Construction on the Mutsora hydroelectric facility began in October 2010 and electricity distribution started in November 2013. Connections to the grid steadily increased until October 2015, when the facility reached its capacity at 530 connections. Since then, new connections have not been accepted.

The impacts of sustainable energy development and rural electrification are often recognised as beneficial to both poverty reduction and environmental conservation. Early studies of rural electrification in developing countries showed gains in agricultural productivity due to electricity-utilising technology both directly (water pumps, mills and lighting for dairy and poultry) and indirectly (cold chains for high-value goods, repair shops for tractors). Micro-enterprises and household cottage industries often are able to increase their productivity with electric tools (carpentry, weaving, and glassblowing).

**The Mutsora run-of-the-river mini hydroelectric facility is located inside the Virunga National Park, North Kivu.**

**WHILE THERE IS SOME HOUSEHOLD AND BUSINESS ELECTRICITY CONNECTIVITY VIA PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GENERATORS, THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION HAS NOT HAD ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY**
welding and sewing machines) and bright lighting to work longer hours into the evenings. Despite these gains, some studies note that rural electrification alone does not bring about vibrant social and economic growth; in fact, it has been shown that grid-based rural electrification often benefits the wealthier members of a community, rather than the poor. Studies of electrification as part of a set of development initiatives demonstrate that policies and a plurality of approaches matter. Examples of these initiatives include structural interventions that address job creation, gender equality, agricultural production and markets, health outcomes associated with cooking fuels, and educational attainment. The interconnected nature of these different aspects of socio-economic life are crucial to understanding the next step in the project’s theory of change: that economic development will lead to a reduction in rebel group recruitment and violent activity. This next step has scant empirical evidence in the eastern DRC, and follow-up research and analysis are needed to delve deeper into the issue.

Research Methods

To explore the dynamics and impacts of hydroelectrification in the Rwenzori sector of Beni territory, we developed a mixed-methods approach utilising randomised stratified sample household surveys, key informant interviews, stakeholder focus groups and business surveys. A baseline study (March 2015) and a follow-up study (October 2015) were conducted using this approach. We hypothesised four primary avenues of socio-economic impact for this rural electrification project: public institutions and services, household well-being, small business connections and agricultural transformation industry.

For our household sampling strategy, we worked within the local administrative structure (which encompasses, in decreasing size order: territories, sectors, groupements, localités, quartiers/villages and dix maisons) to identify a
sample frame, comprising localités served by the Mutsora facility and all localités with boundaries with that localité. For the baseline survey, we collected information about the number of dix maisons in each quartier/village in the sampling area. For the quartier/village in the area currently served by the hydroelectric facility, a structured sampling method was used whereby three dix maisons were chosen from each quartier/village: the nearest to the road, the farthest from the road, and one in the middle at the furthest extent of the power lines. Then a fully randomised sample of dix maisons was surveyed from the surrounding localités, stratified at the localité and village level. This resulted in a sample size of 405 households from villages within the Mutwanga grid’s service area (the treatment area) and 505 households from the surrounding (unserved) area (the control area). In total, 58 (or 15%) of the 393 grid-connected households were surveyed. For the quarterly follow-up, a total of 32 dix maisons were surveyed – at 16 households per dix maison, this gave a sample of 500 households. Dix maisons were randomly selected: two-thirds from the original treatment group and one-third from the original control group.

Focus Groups and Interviews
We used focus group and key informant interviews to gather qualitative data. We sought diversity of opinion through discussions with various geographic, gender and sector-based focal groups. Specifically, we targeted local leadership, agricultural groups, “youth” (aged 18–25), businesspeople, women’s groups and social service providers (hospitals, schools) for information on members of communities who can and do access the hydroelectric grid and those who do not or cannot access the grid. We conducted 10 focus groups and 10 key informant interviews each for the baseline and follow-up. Focus groups were thematically coded and queried according to both emergent themes and research hypotheses.

Business Survey
Businesses were surveyed along four one-kilometre transects, including the primary commercial regions in Mutwanga and in three of the surrounding (non-electrified) localités, and in a one-kilometre radius around the Sicovir factory. Surveyors walked the length of the transects in pairs, one on each side of the street, making note of every business.
they passed according to the type of business, construction (whether permanent building location, kiosk or street vendor) and global positioning system (GPS) coordinates. Surveyors then surveyed every other business on each side of the street. A total of 490 businesses were documented, and 67 grid-connected and 192 non-grid-connected businesses were surveyed. We attempted to survey all 112 grid-connected businesses; however, 25 businesses were missed due to temporary closure, and the remaining 20 grid-connected businesses were permanently closed.

Study Results and Discussion

Public Institutions and Services

Eight public service institutions are connected to the Mutsora grid, including the regional hospital, radio station, orphanage, local government office, army station (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo – FARDC), two schools and the Mutsora (VNP) Ranger Station. The Mutsora hydrofacility provides approximately 15% of its distributed electricity for free to public and government institutions, including the schools and the police station. Electricity provisioned to the hospital comes at a fee, but the hospital is guaranteed first delivery of power, even if the stream flow is low in the dry season and power generation is limited. Having top priority for electricity distribution guarantees the hospital can maintain a cold chain for the blood bank and vaccines. It is also ensured light during surgeries, compared to earlier times when the generator might break down or run out of fuel and surgeons would have to use flashlights. The hospital charges each intake patient a surcharge to help pay for the electricity;
however, this surcharge was lowered from US$3/intake (when they relied on a generator) to US$1/intake with Mutsora hydroelectricity. This is a significant difference for the local community, as daily wages for agricultural labour average US$1.87 for women and US$2.00 for men. Additional benefits at the community level include public lighting in the serviced communities, which is credited with increased security.

### Household Well-being

The 418 grid-connected households at the time of this study constitute approximately 10% of the households in the service area. Connected households spend an average of US$4.51/month on electricity, which is equivalent to 21.5 kWh/month. Of all the households surveyed, 27% report having some source of off-farm employment, which is positively correlated with access to electricity, and with hydroelectric power in particular. Income earned specifically through the use of electricity is reported in 12.1% of households with hydroelectric power and only 1.6% of households without hydroelectric connection.

Households utilise electricity mainly for lighting, which provides their children with the opportunity to study and home-based professionals such as tailors to work longer hours or later in the evening. Households also use electricity for radios, charging cellphones, and televisions. Cottage industries are common, where households utilise their electricity connection to power tools or perform tasks for others – for example, informally charging others’ cellphones. No households in the service area reported cooking with electricity, despite knowledge and expressed interest in the technology. Provision of electricity as an alternative to charcoal cooking is a major goal for VNP, to reduce deforestation in the park. The average household (6 persons/household) around the park uses two 35 kg bags of charcoal in a month,\(^\text{11}\) which at the Mutwanga market price of 500 Congolese francs (Fc) for 3 kg equates to a monthly household expense of US$12.68 on charcoal. While the cost for charcoal is triple the average grid-connected household’s expense on electricity, generating the same amount of cooking heat using electricity could be much more expensive. In addition, reliance on electricity for cooking would necessitate a reliable power supply, which can be a serious issue given limited stream flow during the dry season.

### Job Creation in Small and Micro-enterprises

Small and micro-enterprises (SMEs) are major players in the economies of sub-Saharan Africa. For example, SMEs generate 30% of Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP) and over 90% of job creation outside agricultural production.\(^\text{12}\) In Mutwanga village during this study’s survey period, there were 504 businesses along the major thoroughfares where electricity was being distributed, half of which were surveyed during the study and 22% of which were connected to the Mutsora hydropower. The high demand for electricity by both pre-existing and start-up businesses helped to guarantee a client base ready to consume as much electricity as the Mutsora hydrofacility was able to produce. Of the businesses connected to the Mutsora grid, 35% are newly established because of the advent of hydroelectricity provision. Businesses save an average of US$106/month using Mutsora grid power instead of paying for generator fuel – almost enough to entirely recoup the US$100 connection fee in just one month – but outages in power during the dry season incentivise 30% of these grid-connected businesses to maintain their own back-up source of electricity.

There are six major employers in the service area with over 14 employees– including two religious schools, the radio station, a Fair Trade cocoa processor, the hospital (67 employees), and the Mutsora hydroelectric station itself (35 employees). We were able to document 248 employees in 67 active commercial and public enterprises connected to the network (not including the Sicovir soap factory, detailed later) – an average of 2.4 employees per grid-connected business. (We were not able to survey the remaining 45 grid-connected businesses during the fieldwork.)
periods, so the true number employed will be higher, though the rate may be lower.) In non-grid-connected businesses, we documented 315 employees in 191 businesses – or 1.65 employees per business.

Women own and operate 10.4% of the businesses connected to the grid, and 12.9% of businesses that started because of the availability of electricity are owner-operated by women. Male employees outnumber female employees, regardless of connectivity. Of all businesses surveyed, there are 1.62 male employees for every female employee; businesses without electricity are more equitable, with 1.44 male employees per female employee; for hydro-connected businesses, the ratio is 2.04 males for every female employee; and for non-grid-connected businesses with an alternative electricity source, the ratio is 2.89 males for every female employee.

**Agricultural Transformation Industry**

Sicovir soap factory is located at the edge of Mutwanga. Construction on the facility began in September 2013 and operations began in the spring of 2016. Sicovir will require 650 kVA when the soap factory is running at full capacity. It anticipates purchasing 250 kVA from the Mutsora hydroelectric facility and supplementing the rest of the electricity need with diesel generators.

Sicovir provides employment to the local community through short-term, low-skilled jobs and permanent skilled jobs. During construction periods for the facility, over 250 workers were employed at the site (including factory hires, contracted companies and temporary hires). At the current production level (January 2017), the factory employs 66 workers directly, in addition to 40 externally contracted workers on site. When the factory is operating at full production, it anticipates directly hiring an additional 100 new workers.

In addition to employment provision, the Sicovir factory purchases crude palm oil, palm kernels and palm kernel oil from local producers via local depots. It also purchases other agricultural goods – including wood, beans and rice – directly from local producers. The majority of the population in the Mutwanga area is supported primarily by agriculture, with 66% of households cultivating palm for sale, so there is significant potential for positive economic impacts across a broad population base through agricultural purchases.
During production trials in the second quarter of 2016, for example, the factory purchased at least US$250,000 in local goods from producers and agricultural intermediaries.

Palm farmers in the Rwenzori sector would like to benefit from the direct sale of their products to Sicovir. By cutting out the intermediary agricultural depots and reducing their transportation costs, palm farmers believe they are likely to receive better prices and reduce their risk of suffering road accidents. However, Sicovir’s capacity to purchase directly from farmers is limited by the costs it would incur to drive from village to village picking up small quantities of oil – two or three 20-litre jugs per farmer – when the factory demands an average of 30 metric tonnes of palm oil per day for full production. Since a significant portion of the eventual village-level capital influx through agricultural purchases will come through palm oil purchases, the actual benefit to smallholders themselves remains to be seen.

Summary of Job Creation across all Grid-connected Businesses

In summary of the jobs created and jobs supported by businesses connected to the Mutsora hydroelectric grid, we calculated a ratio of “jobs per megawatt” of installed capacity. This calculation – if scalable – can help inform policy and planning for larger facilities being built in North Kivu. Employment in grid-connected small businesses totals a conservative 248 employees, and 56 of these employees are in businesses that were started because of the Mutsora hydrofacility. There are 35 employees directly employed by the hydrofacility. The Sicovir soap factory has had variable employment since breaking ground in September 2013 – at times, there were over 200 workers at once on the construction site – but in each month over the past four quarters, the facility has employed 56–66 permanent and temporary workers. This means that during the period of this study, a conservative employment calculation of employees in grid-connected businesses is between 310 and 339 workers per month. If this calculation is generalisable across scale, we calculate a monthly ratio of 886–969 jobs per megawatt of installed capacity supported by the hydroelectric facility. In addition, as the Sicovir soap factory was installed due to the development of the hydroelectric facility, at least 118–157 employees per month are directly attributed to the electrification. This job creation corresponds to a conservative ratio of 337–449 jobs per megawatt of installed capacity due directly to the establishment of the hydroelectric facility.

Conclusions

The Mutsora hydroelectric facility servicing Mutwanga village has impacted the community via four primary action pathways: public institutions and services, household well-being, small businesses and agricultural transformation industry. The challenging next steps for researchers and practitioners will be to show whether the impacts outlined above are scalable across larger hydroelectrification projects, whether or not this economic development can help reduce violent conflict and armed group participation in the region, and whether these sorts of projects ultimately benefit both conservation and local communities. While the pathways for economic development in rural communities – in particular, communities in conflict, such as those in the eastern DRC – are complex and challenging, the payoffs of rural electrification in this particular community case study show early signs of promise.

Emily Baker is a Researcher and DRC Programme Coordinator with the Conflict and Development Foundation, an affiliate of Texas A&M University.

Graham Savio is a Researcher and DRC Programme Coordinator with the Center on Conflict and Development at Texas A&M University.

Endnotes

2 All data are findings from our study, unless otherwise noted.
6 Ibid.
8 Cecelaki, Elizabeth and Unit, A.A.E (2000) op. cit.
10 All data are findings from our study, unless otherwise noted.
13 Data from our study results.
AGENDA OF RENEWAL: PROSPECTS FOR STRONGER COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON

Background and Context

In January 2017, António Guterres of Portugal became the ninth Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN). At the end of the same month, Moussa Faki Mahamat, the foreign affairs minister of Chad, was elected as the new African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson by African leaders meeting in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. The coming into office of new chief executive officers of

Above: António Guterres (left) is the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Moussa Mahamat is the African Union Commission Chairperson.
the UN and AU in New York and Addis Ababa respectively offers a unique opportunity for both institutions to revitalise their relationship.

Both Guterres and Mahamat are highly experienced diplomats, who will be on familiar terrain. Guterres was prime minister of Portugal from 1995 to 2002 before assuming the position of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2005 – a post he held for a decade. As head of the UNHCR, Guterres familiarised himself with Africa’s intractable humanitarian crises in Darfur, Libya, South Sudan and other such countries. Mahamat was the minister of foreign affairs for Chad from 2008 up to the time of his election as AU Commission Chairperson. He was a key player in the coalition of Central African states under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, dedicated to crushing the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency in Central Africa.

As the two new leaders develop their visions, a number of proposals are offered in this commentary to renew and deepen the partnership between the UN and the AU in dealing with Africa’s formidable peace and security challenges.

Revisiting UN Security Council Reform

The first issue both leaders should address is the matter of UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. This issue has appeared to stall over the last decade, primarily because of the AU’s position, as detailed in the Ezulwini Consensus. In this document, the AU insists on two permanent seats on an enlarged UNSC, and demands that these positions be equipped with veto powers. This position is at variance with the stance of the Group of Four (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan), which argues that new members of an enlarged UNSC need not be granted the coveted veto power right away. Guterres and Mahamat therefore need to consult and agree on a strategy that could lead to a softening of the AU stance. The AU’s position has stalled the process of enlarging and reforming the UN’s most pre-eminent entity.

Joint UN-AU Action in Stabilising Failing and Fragile States

Both Guterres and Mahamat will be preoccupied with halting the slide to anarchy in South Sudan, shoring up a very weak government in Somalia and supporting the
fragile government in Mali to reassert its control over the vast entirety of its territory. The UN’s Peacebuilding Commission, which is devoted to promoting post-conflict recovery in countries emerging from conflict, has to create synergies with the AU’s Framework for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) to prevent fragile states from sinking into failure.

Guterres and Mahamat need to maintain a consistent line against bad governance in Africa – because it is bad governance that primarily endangers peace and security on the continent. Coups d’état, questionable constitutional reforms removing presidential term limits and so on only fuel dissent, which ultimately ignites street protests and human rights violations, eventually leading to full-blown humanitarian disasters.

Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation in Peace Support Missions

Over the last decade, the UN and AU have cooperated closely in mounting joint peace support missions. Indeed, some missions were initiated by the AU and later transitioned into UN peacekeeping operations. For example, the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) started as the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), with South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique dispatching the first peacekeepers. The joint UN-AU Mission in the Sudan (UNAMID) originally began as an AU deployment in the form of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Guterres and Mahamat will have to consult closely to determine the political and military leadership of hybrid missions, such as UNAMID and others that may be formed in the future. There may be instances when the choice of a Joint Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General might differ from that of the AU Commission Chairperson, given the different constituencies to which the two executives are accountable.

Enhancing United Nations-African Union co-operation in peace support missions should be a priority.
Some African countries believe that the International Criminal Court unfairly targets political figures from the continent.

from that of the AU Commission Chairperson, given the different constituencies to which the two executives are accountable. Such dissonance can be minimised through institutionalised dialogue between the offices of the UN Secretary-General and AU Commission Chairperson. The establishment of the UN Office to the AU Commission (UNOAU) in 2010 has certainly improved communication and collaboration between the UN and AU in the field of peace and security.

UN-AU Cooperation on the International Criminal Court

For the last decade, African countries have complained that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has disproportionately and unfairly targeted African leaders for prosecution. The international arrest warrant issued against President Omar Hassan al-Bashir has been the source of significant grievance among African heads of state. The recent 28th summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, held in January 2017, announced a decision calling for the collective withdrawal of African countries from the ICC. However, current signs do not suggest that there will be a mass African exodus. Guterres should therefore urgently engage Mahamat to persuade African countries to rethink their decision to exit the ICC. The ICC remains an institution that is anchored on a critically important moral foundation. Whatever its imperfections, the ICC seeks to hold those who commit horrendous human rights violations accountable for their crimes, and is motivated by a high moral imperative to curb impunity. Through quiet and constructive diplomacy, Guterres and Mahamat can target certain influential African leaders to advise their peers to rethink the AU’s current position. Withdrawal from the ICC will be a licence for impunity for human rights violators, which in the ultimate analysis will ignite more conflict, instability and human suffering in Africa.

Deepening Collaboration between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council

Guterres and Mahamat can build on the accomplishments of their predecessors in having deepened cooperation between the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). The recent post-electoral crisis in The Gambia demonstrated the efficacy of deploying “African solutions to African problems”.

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After the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) unequivocally condemned the attempt by former leader Yahya Jammeh to subvert the transition of political power to the winner of The Gambia’s 2016 presidential election, Adama Barrow, the AUPSC endorsed the ECOWAS position. The UNSC then granted international legitimacy to the AUPSC/ECOWAS position, which unleashed the political momentum to resolve the crisis peacefully. Both Guterres and Mahamat should recommend joint UNSC-AUPSC fact-finding missions to conflict spots, and joint meetings in New York and Addis Ababa, to symbolically demonstrate the strengthened collaborative partnership between the UNSC and the AUPSC.

Conclusion

The coming into office of UN Secretary-General Guterres and AU Commission Chairperson Mahamat in 2017 offers a propitious opportunity for both leaders to pursue an agenda of renewal in reinvigorating the UN-AU partnership in maintaining international peace and security.

Dr Njunga Michael Mulikita is Dean of the School of Social Sciences at Mulungushi University in Kabwe, Zambia.

Endnotes
1 AMIB was deployed in 2003 and was transferred to the UN in 2004.
2 AMIS was established in 2004 and was transformed into the joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007.